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Introduction
Gulf diversity remains an under-researched topic that is stereotyped as uniform with
its monarchical or Emir system relative to its Middle Eastern counterparts. This is
why this thesis is initiated out of the interest to research a region that is known for its
geopolitical value worldwide. Stereotyped as a region in which citizens enjoy the
wealth of their nation through distribution, the events of 2011 showed otherwise.
When encouraged by Middle Eastern counterparts, uprisings in Bahrain signaled that
not all of the population is at ease, and that being among the “oil wealthy” states does
not necessarily imply stability and bring about citizen satisfaction. Some citizens in
Bahrain have shown that they prioritize more basic freedoms and political
participation. On the other hand, citizens of the UAE have seen minimal calls for
reform and change, and a fairly stable system of rule. Explaining such different paths
and nuancing the over-generalizing aspects of rentierism are at the core of this thesis.
The thesis adopts a socio-historic approach to show that differences in stateformation, types of elites and sectarian structure account for such divergent paths.
This thesis aims at researching the reasons behind the different events Bahrain
and UAE experienced during the 2011 Arab Spring. Despite being similar on many
fronts, the events of the Arab Spring have challenged the Gulf countries to different
degrees. The thesis argues that several socio-historic reasons are at the core of why
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Bahrain witnessed mass uprisings while the UAE did not during the 2011 Arab
Spring.
Though all GCC countries are put together as a coherent group, the Kingdom
of Bahrain and The United Arab Emirates witnessed completely different events
during the Arab Spring. In comparing these two cases, the most similar system design
(MSSD) comparative approach will demonstrate our basic hypothesis/argument: that
deeply-rooted socio-historic differences account and explain the different routes both
cases have experienced.

This thesis aims at explaining why Bahrain witnessed mass protests during the
events of the Arab Spring in 2011, while neighboring UAE remained unaffected
despite several social and political similarities. While both cases have:
monarchical/Emir rule, similar tribal culture, and instances of economic boom from
oil; both cases also differ in instances of parliamentary experiments and degrees of
political activism. Such similarities and differences are key to the analysis; however,
they remain as symptoms that do not explain why protest events unfolded in Bahrain
but not in the UAE. As mentioned above, this thesis hypothesizes that deeply-rooted
socio-historic differences are found in the following: state formation, types of elites,
and sectarian structure and account for the different routes of both cases.

4

Rentierism: Necessary but Not Sufficient
The recent uprisings that shook the Middle East and have become known as
the “Arab Spring” have indeed raised questions about the vulnerability of some
regimes and the persistence of others. Scholars have continued to seek reasoning
behind the events as uprisings sparked in a country after the other. At first glance, the
outcome of the Arab Spring seems to suggest that monarchies are indeed more
persistent than their republican counterparts.1 The assumption that especially these
rentier monarchies will indeed endure longer has been usually attributed to the trickledown effect of oil. Michael Ross has argued that the existence of a natural resource
such as oil and the ability for the regime to utilize it as a tool to gain support has been
exploited for survival over the years, accounting for the persistence of these regimes.2
Lisa Anderson also provides a compelling framework which analyzes how different
regimes respond to rebellion. Anderson contends that skills, resources and
institutional design all play an interchangeable role to different degrees when coming
to respond to unsatisfied crowds. 3 Geographically, the cases of Bahrain and UAE
enjoy great proximity as well as sharing similar regime types headed by Kings or
1

Holger Albrecht, “Authoritarian Transformation or Transition from
Authoritarianism? Insights on Regime Change in Egypt,” in Arab Spring in Egypt:
Revolution and Beyond 2008, eds. Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi (Cairo: The
American University in Cairo Press, 2012), 252. See also Zeina Bicharat, Survival of
non-oil producing monarchies from “Arab Spring”: Morocco and Jordan, The
American University in Cairo, 2014.
2
Michael Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of
Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 1-2.
3
Lisa Anderson, “Authoritarian legacies and Regime Change,” in The New Middle
East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World 2014, ed, Fawaz A. Gerges (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 56.
5

Emirs. They have also shared a similar tribal culture and have experienced similar
colonial experiences over the years as elsewhere across many of the Gulf States.

As mentioned above, some scholars have explained the survival of
authoritarianism in the Gulf region through a distinctive regime type that has the
capacity to co-opt and suppress its population. Consequently, these analysts have used
the economic approach to explain how social services and financial handouts have
been the underlying factor behind regime continuation through appeasement, in other
words economic wealth leads to regime political control. However, this control cannot
be maintained forever. Christopher M. Davidson contends in his latest book that Gulf
authoritarian regimes are on the decline, and that it is just a matter of years before we
see the Sheikhs replaced.4 With the backbone support to his main arguments built on
modernization theory and the effectiveness of “the domino effect”, he claims that
mounting internal and external pressures that will be ignited by the recent events of
the Arab Spring will fuel the decline of the Gulf monarchies.

Davidson discusses a specific type of state-formation that involves tribal pacts
and colonial agreements. British involvement in the state of affairs of the Gulf States
was evident, and grew over time with discovery of oil as a natural resource. The

4

Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf
Monarchies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3.
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utilization of oil by such states is at the core of the analysis and granted them what
Davidson describes as “Eudemonic Legitimacy”, i.e. legitimacy derived from
economic wellbeing. The book lays out what oil wealth has allowed for in these states
ranging from: subsidized utilities, government housing, and grants of land for
commercial use and unemployment social security. On a domestic level, Davidson
argues that there is a problem of sustenance due to declining resources and the
inability to meet rising demand for public sector jobs. On the other hand, he mentions
how sheikhs have been able to survive domestically by means ranging from creating a
unified dress code, to providing for marriage funds, as well as the cooptation of
expatriates and religion.5

On an external level, Gulf monarchies have maintained a solid bilateral
relation with the West. Extensive revenues have partly returned to the West through
the building up of over-equipped militaries in these Gulf monarchies. Over the recent
years, strong bilateral relations have also been on the rise with other Asian powers in
an attempt to diversify their allocation-based economies.6 Large-scale economic joint
ventures have been established as well as the financing of other educational
institutions, increasing the soft power of those Gulf States.
5

Ibid., 116-120
Martin Hvidt, “Economic Diversification in GCC Countries: Past Record and Future
Trends”. Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalization in the
Gulf States. The London School of Economics and Political Science 27, (January
2013): 3.
6
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The above explanations all revolve around mainstream rentier theory,
attributing continuation of regime type to acquisition of money and its distribution to
different degrees around the region. Rent as a concept was used as early as 1860’s by
Marx to explain income that was derived from renting out property. Rentierism as a
theory was first used in the contemporary context by Mahdavi in describing the case
of Iran,7 then used by Hazem Belblawi to describe a state that is heavily engaged in
extracting rent from its natural resources and involving many citizens in the
distribution of it.8 Rentier state theorists have argued that absence of taxation, the
ability to oppress the population and the prevention of changes in class structure are
all products of a rentier economy. Huntington adds that macro level economic
development that builds an industry may yield some type of democracy, but the
reliance on selling natural resources does not contribute much to political
development.9 Running parallel, Ross argues that “oil impedes democracy”, and that
while oil wealth produces some type of development, it hurdles the transition more
than contributing to it. 10 In the Latin American context, Terry Karl explains how the
access to money from resources such as oil can have a negative effect on

7

Hussein Mahdavi, “The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier
States: The Case of Iran,” in Studies in Economic History of the Middle East 1970, ed.
M. A. Cook (London: Oxford University Press).
8
Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World”, in The Rentier State 1987,
eds. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), 51.
9
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 65.
10
Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001):
342-343.
8

development, especially if it coincides with the period of state-building. Such funds
are argued to completely damage state institutions and prevents any decision-making
platforms to emerge. The damage as Karl argues, comes from the idea that economic
activity is replaced by oil funds and that the state tends to fund accelerated
development and control the non-taxed population.11
The below matrix dichotomizes different Middle Eastern states in respect to
their oil wealth, percentage of oil in GDP, and regime type, highlighting those who
witnessed significant street uprisings during the 2011 events. The table clearly
suggests that regime type and oil wealth cannot be sole indicators of regime survival
and persistence. Worthy to note is that none of the monarchies had witnessed regime
change. A successful tool in this case would be the usage of the equation governance
= legitimacy + force.12 In other words, the less the legitimacy of a regime, the more
force it needed to coerce its population and vice versa. In Morocco for example, King
Mohamed counts on his religious legitimacy/affiliation to bring down any opposing
movement. In Bahrain, however, the military crushed the protest movement,
sustaining the Al-Khalifa rule. This was the case mainly because of tribal and

11

Terry Lynn Karl, The Perils of the Petro-state: Reflections on the Paradox of the
Plenty, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1999, 34-35.
12
Bahgat Korany, Redefining Development for a New Generation: A Political
Economy Analysis, in Arab Human Development in the 21st Century: The Primacy of
Empowerment, ed. Bahgat Korany, (Cairo, New York: American University Press),
2014, 7.
9

religious connections with the military, coupled by neighboring Saudi Arabia’s
support.13

Monarchy

Republican

Oil-Wealthy

Oil-Poor

Bahrain – 2.6%
Kuwait – 38.5%
Oman – 20.5%
Qatar – 5.9%
Saudi Arabia – 22.5%
UAE – 11.2
Algeria – 9.1%
Libya - --

Jordan - 0
Morocco – 0

Egypt – 2.6%
Tunisia – 1.8
Syria - -Yemen – 1.9
Sudan – 0.7%
Source: The World Bank, Data, Oil Rents as Percentage of GDP, 2015.
-

No data available

While the cases of Bahrain and UAE do practice forms of rentierism, this
model has been generalized to explain regimes in resource-rich states; especially
those where rent revenues occupy a large percentage of total government revenues.
Rentierism in its over-generalizing form in that case is not sufficient to explain why
Bahrain and the UAE experienced different trajectories during the events of the Arab

13

See also Eva Bellin, Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the
Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring, Comparative Politics, vol. 44, no. 2
(2012), 127-149.
10

Spring. This thesis proposes a modified rentier model that takes into consideration the
socio-historic differences in the cases of Bahrain and the UAE, then showing how
such deeply-rooted causes were further emphasized/sustained by oil money.
It is evidently worthwhile to study how different countries in the Gulf region
have survived the recent waves of uprisings. Despite sharing a monarchial system of
rule, a tribal culture, and similar colonial experiences, both Bahrain and the UAE
differ in socio-historic trajectories leading to different routes and outcomes as
hypothesized by this thesis. Differences in socio-historic trajectories include state
formation characteristics, types of elites and sectarian structure. Each of these
explanatory factors has been present in the cases to different degrees, and is at the
core of the analysis. Degreeism in that sense is a crucial term that has been coined by
Giovanni Sartori to reiterate the necessity for the removal of dichotomies and
replacing them with continuous ones giving the example of democracies and nondemocracies. “Democracy cannot be separated from non-democracy; rather,
democracy is a property that to some different degree can be predicated of all political
systems and, conversely, non-democracy is always more or less present in any
polity”.14

14

Giovanni Sartori, “Comparing and Miscomparing,” Journal of Theoretical Politics
vol.3, no. 3, (1991), 248.
11

Tribalism: What Impact?
The cases of Bahrain and the UAE are chosen as an example of rentier states
that have experienced different socio-historic trajectories leading to a difference in
outcome when faced with challenges of the Arab Spring. Despite the presence of
Rentierism, experiences in state-formation, types of elites, and sectarian structure add
explanatory value and highlight different characteristics to the cases of Bahrain and
the UAE.
A number of contemporary similarities exist between the cases of Bahrain and the
UAE, from the foundational basics pertaining to both of those countries, to
conducting similar day to day policies. Ballantyne provides a comparative analysis of
the foundational principles of the Gulf nation-states. 15 In the case of Bahrain, there is
a clear divide between the legislative, executive and judicial branches, while the case
of UAE shows a system of elite power-sharing, and legislation can involve the
Federal National Council, but it does not need its consent to function. It is important
to note that the UAE has a different form of constitution due to the nature of being a
federation, which is a significant difference in itself. The tribal nature of the region is
one that is distinct from any other, and the mere existence of a union between tribes
shows a distinct type of power-sharing.

15

W. M. Ballantyne, “The Constitutions of the Gulf States,” Arab Law Quarterly 1,
no. 2 (February 1986), 159-162.
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This tribal nature of the region is indeed one of the most important characteristics
that one must expand on, and directly pertains to the discussion on structure and
construction of actual Gulf States. Khoury shows how the role of tribes is significant
to the construction of major political systems and institutions.16 In the case of the
Gulf, we have seen certain regions that had not been fully colonialized, and tribalism
has indeed had a deep-rooted history in empires that have developed to take part in
recent concept of a modern state. It is crucial to note that the concept of the modern
nation-state in the European sense differs substantially from what we are confronted
with today in the region.

The notion of a “state” is yet another term characterized by degreeism. Khoury
reviews various literatures on the state showing two sides of the spectrum. On the one
hand, the state is identified as an entity using different forms of power to maintain an
organized society. On the other hand, the state is seen as requiring borders, some type
of central government and a homogeneous population.17 But since the tribal basis is
very present in these states, it is important to highlight the various definitions that
pertain to “tribe”. Tapper has approached the tribe as being a group that comes
together on the basis of kinship, and a group that considers itself different from the
others in terms of custom, language or (real or perceived) origins, and usually share
16

Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, (eds.) Introduction to Tribes and State
Formation in the Middle East, (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd, 1996), 4-5.
17
Ibid., 6.
13

similar political thought, yet not necessarily unified under one leader.18 On the other
hand, Albert Hourani has identified the tribe not necessarily as kinship, but rather a
belief of common origin sometimes inscribed in the name of the family or tribe.19
Scholars of social sciences usually find it difficult to find and agree on an allencompassing definition for a certain phenomenon. As argued by Fuad Khuri, a tribal
society has a “cultural substance”. This cultural substance can endure because values
and beliefs are abstract, and therefore members of the tribe will subscribe to the
values and beliefs, even though they might not have a clear-cut definition of such
values. Tribes in their basic sense seem to have a much more uniform group dynamic
within them. In the case of the Middle East, tribal interactions have usually formed
states such as the cases among the Gulf monarchies. In such context, it is crucial to
define the term “chiefdom” which has also been used to describe a tribe that has
successfully established some type of leadership; chiefdoms do not only bring about
kinship, but also have a more regulated system of leadership. According to Tapper,
this tribal leader or chief plays a crucial role in controlling and regulating the
interactions between his tribesmen, and have the ability to sustain a continuous flow
of goods and services to his followers to maintain their support and allegiance. Tapper
adds that the chiefdom must create some type of regulatory mechanism to sustain

18
19

Ibid., 5
Albert Hourani, “Tribes and States in Islamic History,” in Ibid., 304.
14

leadership such as that of establishing a “hereditary dynasty”. 20 In an attempt to
understand the reasons behind the development of tribes into chiefdoms, Khoury
observed that tribes had to be better-off economically, and therefore offer to share the
economic surplus in exchange for recognition. By doing so, tribes could sustain
themselves both on the day to day services to their followers, and also retain power to
avoid any challenges.

20

Khoury and Kostiner, op.cit, 9.
15

Conceptual Framework
Deeply rooted socio-historic differences are a characteristic of different routes
Bahrain and the UAE experienced during the Arab Spring, such deeply-rooted factors
must be distinguished from other differences that might exist and are argued to be
effects or outcomes of the deeply rooted causes.
Symptoms, Effects or Outcome of Deeply Rooted Causes:
•
•
•

Similarities:

Monarchial system of rule
Tribal culture
Similar colonial experience

Differences:
Bahrain:

•

UAE:

•
•
•
•

Political parties / civil society
organizations
Parliament
Other means of political mobilization
No political activism, extreme
absolutism
Rich in oil revenues

Deeply rooted socio-historical factors that are different in each of the two countries,
and focused on here:
•

State-formation

•

Types of elites – degree of power-sharing

•

Sectarian structure / political function

By emphasizing these socio-historic factors, this thesis adopts a critical
approach to rentier theory. While the availability of funds does play a role, it cannot

16

be used as an all-round approach to account for the situation in any and every one of
the Gulf States. Having a no-taxation policy and financial rewards as rents are not
sufficient to describe the survival of all and every Gulf State.21 In his study, Herb
argues that oil wealth produces something similar to development in certain areas that
does not necessarily have the same effect as other industrial sources of wealth, but is
also likely to have positive effects on democracy.22 Okruhlik adds that structuring of
the market and how the flow of funds occurs is the problem, in the sense that politics
must play a part in explaining the current state of Middle Eastern monarchies.23 He
proposes that rentier analysis in the Middle East must be redesigned to fit the personal
exercises adopted by extraction, intrusion and penetration. All of these characteristics
link the state with society whether through formal or informal means that are
exclusive to each society. Okruhlik concludes that it is crucial to integrate historical
and social contexts into contemporary analysis rather than merely starting analysis
with the exponential growth of oil revenues in the 1970’s.

24

In other words “the

receipt of oil revenues per se does not explain development or opposition or relations
between ruler and ruled. The manner in which the rent is deployed, however, tells us

21

Michael Herb, “No Representation Without Taxation? Rents, Development, and
Democracy,” Comparative Politics 37, no. 3 (2005): 297-298.
22
Ibid., 300.
23
Gwenn Okruhlik, “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The
Political Economy of Oil States,” Comparative Politics, (1999): 2.
24
Ibid., 12-13.
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much. The choices made can distort, inhibit, or accelerate political dialogue and
economic growth”.25

Methodology
This thesis adopts a socio-historical comparative analysis between Bahrain and
the UAE. In that regard, this thesis adopts the Most Similar System Design (MSSD)
in analyzing the socio-historic paths undergone by Bahrain and UAE that will explain
why Bahrain and the UAE experienced different events during the Arab Spring. The
MSSD is based on a system in which the researcher chooses cases that are similar in
as many features as possible to be able to minimize the experimental variables.26 The
MSSD is concerned with the system level of analysis, where similarities and
differences are explained in terms of system patterns and divergence respectively. In
the words of Przeworski and Teune “Common systemic characteristics are conceived
as controlled for, whereas intersystemic differences are viewed as explanatory
variables. The number of shared characteristics sought is maximal and the number of
not shared characteristics sought is minimal”.27 Differences that are found among the
systems studied will imply two theoretical implications. The first implies that factors
that are shared by both Bahrain and UAE are not applicable to the explanation of

25

Ibid., 13.
Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry
(New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970), 32-34.
27
Ibid.,
26

18

different routes during the Arab Spring since differences have been observed. The
second implication concerns the differences that are found between the cases, such
differences or any interaction among them can be used to explain different state
behavior 28 While the MSSD in that sense focuses on differences related to both cases
in the study, one shortcoming to the findings is the inability to be generalized beyond
the cases.

As this thesis argues that differences in socio-historic trajectories are what
explained the different episodes each country was exposed to during the events of the
Arab Spring, it is important to note that other contemporary differences exist. These
differences include parliament in the case of Bahrain, and having a history of
mobilization. Instances of elections do not only show the existence of political parties,
but more importantly in voting patterns that could be significant in reflecting the
construct of the kingdom. While in the UAE there are no signs of political activism,
coupled with the presence of large revenues from oil resources. These differences are
crucial to the thesis, but are treated as an effect or outcome of the different routes in
each case, because they are an effect or product of the socio-historic differences,
rather than being causal in themselves. The case of Bahrain is an interesting one that
shows the existence of actual political parties and several instances of elections on a
national level. Bahrain is also among the less fortunate of the Gulf countries when it
28

Ibid., 34
19

comes to oil reserves, and economic welfare per se. The case of UAE on the other
hand provides an interesting example of a recently emerging international business
center and skyrocketing economy. Yet interestingly enough, the UAE does not allow
for any type of political contribution from its citizens.

Responses to Arab Spring (Outcome)

As we have established, rentierism is a tool that has been recycled over the years in
times of discontent to co-opt the population. Just a mere example displaying the
power of rentierism was evident during Arab Spring in 2011 when the UAE
government increased salaries of those working in the public sector up to 70% as well
as offering several privileges to the citizens.29 Such example shows how the state can
successfully buy out the loyalty of its people. In this case, one can assume that the
economy is indeed integral to the maintenance of a certain political order and acts as a
cooptation measure that does not involve much violence or deterrence. Formal
patronage has been seen in patterns of bureaucratic employment that has fragmented
potential opposition formations and ensured that they are dependent on the state.30

29

Kristin Smith Diwan, “Royal Factions, Ruling Strategies, And Sectarianism in
Bahrain,” in Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf, ed. Lawrence G Potter, (New
York: Oxford University Press), 2014, 144.
30

Steffen Hertog, “Saudi Arabia’s Political Demobilization in Regional Comparison:
Monarchial Tortoise and Republican Hares,” in The Arab State and Neoliberal
Globalization: The Restructuring of State Power in the Middle East, ed. Laura
Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi (Reading, UK: Ithaca, 2009), 75.
20

The case of Bahrain, when approached through an economic lens, appears to be
different.

The existence of trade union leaders was indeed a significant point in the Bahraini
case that date back to the series of strikes that took place between 1954-56. Labor
movements, as a form of political activity, are significant in developing discussions
on origins, education, religious affiliations and political orientations. Such political
activity was not only portrayed in having elections, but more importantly in voting
patterns that could be significant. The development of a radicalized, industrial
proletariat was a powerful factor in shifting the government’s emphasis in economic
development away from heavy industry with working class to more “white collar”
work that is based on finance. Active labor movements have usually been united
under the umbrella of al-Wifaq party, who is mostly composed of Shiite Muslims.
According to Wehrey, opposition in Bahrain has had a history of launching successful
anti-regime movements in which they can channel their demands and press for a more
free and fair legislative body.31 Despite having an elected parliament, the body was
very inefficient and more or less incapable of channeling any demands from within.
The inability of al-Wifaq to formally channel demands of the workers during the five
years they were present in parliament between 2006 and 2011 was reflected in the
uprisings taking place in the “Pearl Roundabout”.
31

Frederic Wehrey, “Bahrain’s Decade of Discontent,” Journal of Democracy 24, no.
3 (2013), 117.
21

Being present in Bahrain during the events of 2011, Toby Matthiesen provides a
primary source account of how events unfolded, and how the regime had framed the
situation in an attempt to bring the protests to a halt. In one account, Matthiesen refers
to a dialogue between one of the expatriate labor leaders and representatives working
there during the early days of the uprising who describes the situation as “It’s the
Shiite, they always make trouble. They don’t like the ruling family, and they want to
take our jobs”.32 Such first-hand account reflects the centrality of the ethnic factor and
the extent to which Shiite have been framed and being held responsible for the events
as they unfold. With the unfolding of events, and the offering of the Prince Salman
further concessions, people returned to the Pearl square days after the shootings.33 As
uprisings continued day in day out, and people found more public space to ask for the
restructuring of the regime altogether, Saudi Arabia had sent troops along with some
UAE police forces, to limit protest in Bahrain, bringing the country to a lockdown
with martial law, and curfews coupled by mass arrests to put the uprising down.34

32

Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring that
Wasn’t, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press), 2013, 34.
33
Ibid., 36.
34
Ibid., 50-53.
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Chapter 1: A Critical Approach to Classical Rentierism

Is oil a curse?
Throughout the past century, Rentierism as a concept has dominated the
literature, claiming positive correlation between oil and authoritarianism. Scholars
such as Micheal Ross, Christopher Davidson, and Samuel Huntington among others
have all argued along the lines that oil is indeed a curse economically and/or
politically to the nations that have it. This thesis revisits the idea that rentierism has an
equal effect all across the board, focusing specifically on the cases of Bahrain and
UAE during the recent events of the Arab Spring. This thesis aims to add a sociohistoric perspective to rentierism to provide a more encompassing approach to explain
events in Bahrain and UAE. . In other words, oil money was utilized to emphasize
and sustain the already existing deeply-rooted socio-historic factors that explain why
Bahrain and UAE experienced different events during the Arab Spring.

During the early years of the twentieth century, the Arabian Gulf was found to
be floating over vast oil reserves that would indeed bring about future geopolitical
importance to the region. Such geopolitical importance of Gulf oil had reached its
climax during the early years of World-War II. Countries at war found it crucial to
control the Arabian Gulf and utilize its geographic proximity to extend their influence

23

and assert control. Britain’s influence and administration was the most prevalent
during that time as it relied on Bahrain as a source of oil. During the years of the war,
the ports were heavily used by Americans and British, expanding their trade across
the Persian ports.35 Britain was also keen to protect and control the air route over the
Gulf where civilian aircrafts had to pass to reach India, Singapore and Australia.

Bahrain was seen as a significant asset that Britain had utilized to exploit its
oil fields and refineries, as well as the established naval base at Jufayr. Controlling the
area surrounding the Arabian Peninsula meant that Britain could administer and
control the access to the Indian Ocean, Asia and the Pacific.36 Britain had utilized air
and sea transport to service the war through transport of personnel and material
through this area in the later stages of the war. With growing involvement in the
region, the United States had also made use of the British facilities and later on
establishing an airfield in Dhahran, and administered small naval activity in the Gulf
from Bahrain. Increasing American involvement later materialized in the oil sector
and then consolidated with the creation of The Arabian-American Oil Company
(ARAMCO) in Saudi Arabia.37

35

J. E. Peterson, “The Historical Pattern of Gulf Security,” in Security in the Persian
Gulf: Origins, Obstacles, and the Search for Consensus, ed. Lawrence G. Potter and
Gary G. Sick (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 21.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid., 22.
24

The second half of the twentieth century would bring about an inevitable
decline in British involvement and a shift in more American involvement in the
region. The Western strategy shifted to focus on maintaining friendly relations with
the newly-independent states and to secure Gulf oil. With British involvement in the
region coming to an end in 1971, the United States had taken over the leadership role
despite its great unfamiliarity with the region. While the United States played a huge
role in training and equipping Saudi Arabia and Iran with arms, The United States
connection to the newly established states was more bilateral in nature due to their
full integration into the international system.38

The emergence of oil in the early decades of the 20th century is believed to
have led to important implications in the region and a potential change in its
geopolitical value. The discovery of oil also brought rise to a literature on the political
economy of rentier states. Oil was also hypothesized as a curse rather than a full
blessing, and that the distributive capacity made possible to its governments stretched
vertically along the social strata of society. Rentierism as a concept was born out of
the notion that oil accumulated wealth to the governments and therefore losing the
need to tax its population as well as develop a production based economy.39 Such
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relationship between state and society was concluded to have rendered
democratization very unlikely.

While rentier theory has been applicable to oil rich states in South America
and elsewhere, the counties of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) occupy a greater
share in contemporary analysis. Dissatisfaction with the concept of rentierism was
born out of the fact that oil had different effects in different parts of the world.
Norway has been used throughout the literature as a prime example of country with
abundant oil reserves, yet has managed to remain democratic and contain problems
such as “dutsch disease”.40 Scholars who focused on the Middle East had started to
question the applicability of the theory. In his focus and analysis of the Saudi Arabian
economy and state institutions, Tim Niblock argued that oil was not necessarily a
curse and that it contributed to the development of institutions in Saudi.41 While some
scholars have attempted at times to dismiss rentierism all in all as part of the
explanation, others such as Luciani and Hertog have contended that the concept
remains relevant, however in need of taking into consideration changing
circumstances. 42 Springborg presents the two different interpretations of rentier
economy and its implications on rentier states. On one hand, the argument stands that
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these rentier states are on the verge of decline as their oil revenues drop. The other
view denotes that rentier states are very unlikely to decline, and that they will
continue to engage in their process of reform to develop their institutions.43

Luciani states that the ruling elites in the Gulf States have been committed to
developing their economies and engaging in diversification.44 Luciani also adds that
oil is not necessarily a curse, but rather an asset when coupled with good public
policies that encourage growth of the infrastructure, the effects of the Dutch Disease
can be avoided. Luciani concludes that GCC policy makers have been successful in
implementing the correct developmental model to ensure diversification of industry
away from pure rentierism.

Along the lines of Luciani, members of the GCC have all adopted the same
developmental model in an attempt to escape the resource curse syndrome and induce
development. While this thesis acknowledges that rentierism does indeed play a role
in shaping the political outcome of the GCC states, it remains a tool that is utilized by
the governments to promote a certain model or sustain the status quo.45 Rentierism
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alone however might not be sufficient in describing why certain events happened in
one place and not the other despite sharing similar to equal performances.

Rentierism as a concept has emerged recently first in Hussein Mahdavi’s
explanation in the case of Iran 46 , and later on by Hazem Biblawi to describe the
generation of wealth by a few to be distributed among the greater population.47 If we
look however into the histories of those newly developed Gulf States, one might
argue that oil wealth is simply a transformation from one prosperous economy that
was mainly based on management of ocean trade to the extraction and use of oil
revenues. While Gulf countries had lived off and prospered through ocean trade they
had never produced anything of their own but were successful middlemen and
business makers.48 Oil wealth in the contemporary Gulf countries has produced no
industry, and has acted as the primary exchange commodity when dealing with the
outside world. Despite having abundant oil reserves, the Gulf has indeed been
engaged in the process of diversification that Luciani had outlined above. Oil
generated wealth has been used to revive the old ports that had been used for trade
becoming new international hubs. Being such wealthy nations gave birth to job
opportunities that invited people from abroad to service the luxuries and facilities

46

Mahdavi, op-cit.
Beblawi, op-cit, 51.
48
Izady, op-cit, 69
47

28

until this very day with large numbers of expatriates ranging from 39% of the
population being expatriates in Oman to as high as 82% in UAE.49

A Framework of Modified Rentierism
This thesis will revisit the rentier state model by taking into consideration the
socio-historic differences that exist between Bahrain and UAE to explain why mass
uprisings occurred in the first but not the latter. It is important to reiterate and
underline, however, that this thesis does not aim at ruling out the effects of classical
rentierism; but rather emphasize the transformations that were brought about as a
result of the socio-historic differences, similar oil wealth notwithstanding. In other
words, deeply-rooted differences that are exclusive to each of the cases of UAE and
Bahrain were met with different responses therefore yielding different contemporary
internal structures. While both cases under comparison, and the region as a whole,
seem to share a common history in regards to relations with foreign powers and
similar version of monarchy rule, there are current differences that were born out of
their different historical experiences with state-formation, types of elites and their
sectarian structure.

Gwenn Okruhlik proposes that rentier analysis of the Middle East must be
taken on a case-by-case basis to account for different patterns of extraction, intrusion
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and penetration.50 In that sense, a socio-historic perspective when dealing with the
contemporary status of the Gulf is crucial to the analysis. Life did not just start in
these states when oil was discovered and prices skyrocketed in the 1970’s, but oil was
just another phase –though important- in the developmental track of those states.
Okruhlik also adds that the social structure of society in the pre-oil era is key to the
analysis of contemporary oil states of the GCC. Being resource rich in this case “does
not explain development or opposition or relations between ruler and ruled. The
manner in which the rent is deployed, however, tells us much”.51

Referring to the previously mentioned works of Michael Ross and earlier
rentier scholarly works, Matthew Gray provides a rather compelling framework that
outlines a more contemporary version of rentier state theory. Gray proposes dividing
rentierism into three distinct stages: Classical rentier state theory, specialized and
conditional rentier state theory, and a theory of “late rentierism”.52 For Gray classical
rentierism manifested the early tenants of the theory between the 1950’s and the
through the 1980’s.53 As mentioned before, the classical rentier state theory rendered
the state autonomous from society. In other words, the availability of rents allowed
the governments to buy off its citizens in return for democratic sacrifice. Citizens who
50
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did not accept such tradeoff were sidelined and repressed. Such classical rentier
theory has been characterized by linking undemocratic government and oil.
Accordingly, the effects of oil on democratic government can be summarized into
three main points/stages rentierism, repression and modernization.54 The rentier effect
basically dictates that people are not taxed in exchange for political solidarity. The
repression effect shows how abundant oil resources have allowed for the creation of
repressive system that is capable of bringing down any radical attempts for change.
The modernization effect is the engagement of the state in development projects to
meet the needs of the citizens.
As this thesis has stated, rentier effects go beyond the generalizations that
were first advocated by classical rentier state theory. Michael Ross himself revisited
his approach later and acknowledged some shortcomings to his initial theory.55 Along
the lines of Gray, it was the unfolding of events and change in the social structure of
the Arab Gulf states that outdated the initial theory, with a need to update it to
accommodate a different phase. This was the case in what Gray identified as the
second phase manifested in what he calls specialized and conditional rentier state
theory.56 The second phase was a response to the inadequate answers that the initial
theory provided. More precisely its applicability was slightly questioned by states in
the Gulf such as Dubai, which was able to globalize over the past decade and adopt a
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policy to diversify their economy. Classical rentier state theory had also disregarded
the two significant oil booms that changed the spending patterns of oil wealth, or even
the variations that existed among the Gulf nations. This was “also inseparable from
questions of accountability and responsiveness that are, in turn, related to the
democracy debate and, of course, to wider political economy elements of the statesociety relationship”. 57 This is why specialized rentier state theory advocates for a
more inclusive analysis of the Gulf States, rather than a one size fits all approach.
As this thesis has advocated from the beginning, the Gulf countries might
appear an undifferentiated block from the outside, but significantly different if
analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Specialized or revised rentier state theory promotes
an analysis that takes into consideration the specifics of each countries historical
trajectories and accounts for the social interactions and developmental options of the
Gulf states which were ignored by the classical approach. This is why this thesis lines
up with specialized rentier state theory to include historical trajectories and analysis
of socio-historic experiences on an intra-state level including decades of state
formation and elite interactions. More convincingly, the thesis builds on specialized
rentier state theory to argue that these states were not initially born the day oil was
founded and started to be extracted, but there was some type of established rules set
by the elites functioning within a certain institutional form. These very dynamics of
state-formation act as the building blocks of the modern Gulf states.
57
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Specialized rentier state theory also includes aspects of international relations.
According to Gray the theory acknowledges that external threats and interstate
conflict also contributed to the creation of the modern Gulf state. With the existence
of oil came the threat of conflict over resources acquisition or effect on the national
and regional political scene. This was mainly due to the fact that oil had different
effects in different places. Such addition to classical rentier state theory is significant
in analyzing the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and more related to the thesis,
Bahrain’s dependence on Saudi Arabian funds for development projects, but more
importantly internal security and stabilization. The crux of the argument is that even
when these states became wealthy from oil, their states did not become more stable on
the domestic level or secure on the international level.

Along the lines of specialized/revised rentier state theory (under the second
phase) is the state’s conditional aspect mostly concerned with state autonomy. Such
line of thought advocates for a specific analysis of the state and its relative
vulnerability or responsibility towards society. Conditional rentier state theory
discusses the idea that the state is always alert to societal needs and plays an active
role in providing for its citizens. Basically, “the state must do more than simply buy
off or repress society”.58 Examples of state interference to provide for development on
the national level are seen in modernization waves that smaller Gulf states like Dubai
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championed in the 1990’s and later followed by neighboring emirates. Dubai had
initiated deliberate and strict strategies of gradual economic diversification away from
oil. Dubai pioneered the process of globalization in the region by bringing down trade
barriers and opening up for free trade and investment as well as international quality
education that attracted citizens and expatriates from around the globe. It is important
to note that throughout this transformation in Dubai, political stability and
sustainability were indeed at the core of such rapid globalization and integration into a
world economy. Unlike the classical rentier state theory claim, the process required
“responsive” and “forward-looking” state institutions that “must still be responsive to
society if –as it has done in the past couple of decades- it wants to ensure its longterm survival”.59

The aforementioned framework offers our starting point of analysis from
which we can compare the different socio-historic tracks and state-society interactions
that can explain the different events Bahrain and UAE experienced during the Arab
Spring. In that sense, we focus on differences in three basic variables: state-formation
patterns, types of elites, and sectarian structures. Their distinguishing patterns are
found in various degrees and prevail more in one of the cases than the other. Along
the lines of Okruhlik, if we analyze the social structure of society during the pre-oil
era, one will find a different type of state-formation. Bahrain had emerged through the
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domination of a minority group who controlled agricultural land by force. UAE
however, depended on the coming together of a number of emirates to form a union
that was based on consent and cooperation. It is therefore logical to believe that
governments would choose to allocate their oil funds differently. Dealing with
different types of elites who emerged through the popular pearl industry in Bahrain,
the government had to cooperate with those merchant elites that existed as a way to
garner support and legitimacy. As such, Bahrain was also faced with a proletariat that
was able to come together and form opposition groups. Such social constructs were
able to lobby for some type of representation, giving birth to a couple of
parliamentary experiments. The coming together of business elite in the case of UAE
was different. With most of the social strata skewed to the upper-middle and upper
class, and an enormous expatriate working force more than four times the native
population UAE did not have to confront any worker calls for unionization or
representation. The rationale behind the difference in those cases is to actually show
that despite having oil wealth at their disposal, Bahrain’s regime might rationally
prioritize security over economy, and invest in force build-up rather than public sector
enhancement. Indeed, sectarianism is another a socio-historic factor that is only
prevalent in the case of Bahrain. Having a two-third majority Shiite population that
does not rule does indeed yield different internal group dynamics than the mostly
homogeneous UAE society.

35

State-Formation:
It is worthy to note that the modern Gulf monarchies of today have emerged out of
tribal coalitions that inhabited the region centuries ago. Butti Sultan Al-Muhairi
highlights how different tribes started to settle in the early 19th century. 60 Among
them were the “Qawasim, a maritime people who lived in Ras Al-Khaimah and
Sharjah Emirates. The other major tribal force was the Bani Yas federation, who
spread their influence in the lower Gulf and dominated the area stretching between
present day Dubai and Abu Dhabi”.61 What is worth noting in the establishment of the
modern-day Gulf States is the process by which those tribes were transformed into
chiefdoms creating coalitions. In the case of Bahrain, we see the coming together of
different tribal identities under the most dominant Al-Khalifa family who has
governed Bahrain since the 1780’s. 62 Al-Khalifa family had first imposed its
domination by controlling most of the agricultural land on the island. Later on, they
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succeeded to establish a power-sharing mechanism in distributing land according to
proximity with Al-Khalifa family.
The UAE on the other hand is indeed an interesting case of federal unity. Initially
the federation would have included modern day Bahrain and Qatar, but they backed
out following British withdrawal.63 The interesting aspect that one must highlight in
the case of the UAE is the inequality among the members. Such inequality required
consensus and realization that their unification was for their overall benefit as one.
Sheikh Zayed has been continually praised for being an “ardent advocate of political
cooperation between the Gulf States”.64 Despite the fact that the creation of the union
was successful, a number of challenges had faced the newly-born state that brought
about a number of different tribes that existed in the region. As Heard-Bey puts it the
emirates have always been “unequal brothers”. Abu-Dhabi, for example, was the
largest in land size, as well as the richest when it came to oil revenues. Dubai, on the
other hand, was the most populous, and others like Sharjah were well known for
education.65 Such inequality meant that cooperation was crucial and interdependence
would remain as the core building block of the union. One must not underestimate
such process of unification that brought about several smaller “cheifdoms”. Shortly
after becoming President,

Sheikh Zayed was quoted saying “our experiment in
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federation arose from a desire to increase the ties that bind us, as well as from the
conviction of all that we were part of one family, and that we must gather together
under one leadership”.66The difference in the UAE that makes it distinct from other
Gulf States is the federal system that has grown to adapt to the historical tribal nature
of the Emirates.67

Types of Elites
Formal institutional patronage networks indicate a dominance of a certain actor
over the polity that does not allow the emergence of other autonomous groups that are
equally powerful. In the case of Bahrain and UAE, one will historically find great
involvement by the British in the internal affairs of these emerging states. Though not
formally colonizers, the British had shown dominant presence in the region. The
discovery of oil in the Gulf during the initial decades of the 20th century had
significant implications on the region as a whole. It is significant to note that Bahrain
was the center of the popular pearl industry that was controlled by “rich merchant
families” that were tied to Al-Khalifa.68 The rise of the oil industry brought about the
decline of the pearl industry, and in turn a change in the role of its merchant elites
who now became part of the regime’s economic dependents and a main source of
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trust loyal to Al-Khalifa family. As for the UAE, before the union in 1971, tribes were
the dominant political actors, and the sheikhs would usually function through the
“diwan”, which was usually composed of the sheikh’s tribe, other tribal leaders and
representatives. The “majlis” on the other hand was a forum-like gathering in which
people (ordinary citizens) could voice their problems or concerns to the sheikh in
person or to close advisors.69

The success of the Gulf monarchies was evident in their ability to transform their
tribes into nominal modern societies while at the same time maintain their traditional
values. The process of transformation was described by Foley who shows how some
monarchies succeeded in enhancing their legitimacy through revenues accumulated
from oil, and were actually able to maintain their long-standing tradition of
governance till this day. By doing so the monarchies were able to “modernize their
societies in the twentieth century, while retaining governing traditions and
monarchies”. 70 This was more the case in UAE than in Bahrain, where other
challenges such as sectarianism existed and were a frequent source of discontent.

Bahrain’s situation was a dominant Sunni minority that controls the Kingdom and has
established its own hierarchical network to govern and control. Such control has been
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mostly inflicted on the resources of the kingdom, in an attempt to allocate and create
networks of trust that support the leadership. Despite having a 50% expatriate
population,

71

the source of the island’s discontent has usually occurred along

sectarian lines. The dominant Sunni minority are found among the higher classes
either being members of Al-Khalifa family or among the merchant elites that
surround the sheikh. The middle class consists mainly of other tribes who have allied
with those of Al-Khalifa and other smaller traders. The subordinate strata have
continued to consist of the working class who usually work in agriculture and as
craftspeople. 72 The middle class has usually been coopted by the state through
employment in the public sector where benefits are offered such as subsidized
housing. The subordinate class is of great importance here, not only that it was nonexistent in the case of the UAE, but also due to being predominantly Shiite with some
Sunnis in the industrial sector. While the sectarian division was usually a point of
friction, workers usually had negative sentiments towards expatriates who were seen
as a competition for their jobs. As Lawson notes, the discovery of oil brought about a
decline in industrial and agricultural production, affecting the poorer social strata of
society. 73 Following the intervention of the central administration in an attempt to
control prices and manage labor through a severe crackdown on expatriates, the
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working class recovered its role.

The UAE shows significant differences and different formations at the social
level. According to CIA estimates, the native UAE citizens account for about 19%,
while more than 80% are mainly expatriates operating in different sectors of the
economy. 74 One should highlight that the local population have a strong sense of
solidarity among each other, and usually rank in the upper and middle class leaving
the labor work to the expatriates.75 What is worth noting is the huge sentiments and
nationalist aspirations that the UAE carry until this very day. It is not only a privilege
to live in such a wealthy nation, but more importantly retaining everything of their
identity with every emirate having something in particular to contribute to the
federation. 76

On the personal network level, both countries have created clientalistic networks
that are maintained through “jobs, bureaucratic protection and access, money,
contracts and other state services”.77 The clients are responsible for passing on the
patron’s message creating a wider base of cooptation. The case of the UAE is an
interesting one in that regard, when it comes to the business relationships among its
citizens. Certain Gulf countries have succeeded in maintaining political stability
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through several acts of “consolidating their own networks of trusted individuals in the
bureaucracy, the political sphere, the economic sector, and the military apparatus who
are directly tied to the authoritarian center”.78 Examples of business elite cooptation
has been prevalent in the case of the UAE as described by Almezaini who shows how
the regime has perfected survival despite several economic turbulences and has
managed to engage “different major merchants in the diversification process in the
private sector” and attracting foreign direct investments. 79 While techniques of
developing clientalistic networks have been adopted in both countries, different social
structures have yielded different outcomes in each country. As mentioned above, the
skewed social class of the UAE has been satisfied with the living standards, leaving
calls for political representation virtually non-existent. While in Bahrain, calls for
representation in the political structure have been prevalent among the lower classes
of society. Such calls have usually created a dilemma among the Bahraini leadership,
who were stuck between calls of liberalization, and the need to maximize power.

The roots of present political structure in Bahrain can be traced back to 1961,
where a partnership was instituted between the previous Emir and his brother who
acted as Prime Minister. While the Emir appeared to be popular for his ongoing
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efforts to reform, the Prime Minister ensured the continuation of the bureaucracy,
budget and security forces overseeing the continuation of authoritarianism. In 1973,
reform brought about the 30-member elected parliament with full legislative power.
Two years later, the rising alliance between opposition forces could have actually
controlled the parliament, and was shut down. As Abdulhadi Al-Khalaf has argued,
“this first parliament was never a truly democratic body, but rather a form of
institutionalized tribalism and sectarianism guided by certain rules of conduct. Once a
cross-sectarian coalition began to emerge and threatened al-Khalifa absolutism, the
experiment was ended. It was a pattern that would repeat itself again in 2010”.80

Sectarian Structure
Bahrain in its modern form had seen myriad challenges in the late years of the
18th century. Being the dominant tribe in Bahrain, the Khalifa family had emerged as
a powerful tribe that forcefully dominated the island’s majority of indigenous Shiite
population. These yielded decades of instability for Bahrain, as well as drawing the
British forces more deeply in the internal affairs of the country.
According to Diwan, the Khalifa family had continued to impose its tribal rule
over the Shiite peasantry.81 Such dominant nature of emergence based on conquest
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had controlled the resources, allowing tribes who cooperated to become allies and
established a close relationship with the leadership during the times of the pearl
industry and again with the discovery of oil. The Khalifa family continued to tighten
its control over the resources, and ensured that Sunni tribes who lost their pearl
industry’s resources due to the decline had moved into other businesses, and joined
with the already established merchant elite to maintain and enlarge this strong support
for the ruling Al-Khalifa. The Shiite population of Bahrain at that time, were left
disadvantaged because their villages remained lacking in education with minor
improvements in their jobs as workers. Despite being isolated for a period of time in
the more rural areas, such differential treatment was opposed by national movements
that started to materialize in the 1950’s and the 1970’s. These were also echoed by
other mixed uprisings materializing in the capital and joining solidarity with shared
economic interest and demand for greater political accountability.82

Despite having a long history of exile and struggle with the British leadership
in the early decades of the 20th century, the Khawalid remain a crucial royal faction in
the case of Bahrain that must be closely studied to understand the power sharing
dynamics each country possesses. The Khawalid are a branch of the Khalifa family
that was marginalized by the British for having a hardline position against their Shiite
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counterparts.83 The Khawalid had seen their rise with the emergence of King Hamad
in 1999 who came into power with several reforms and who is considered among the
soft-liners of the regime. Immediately the Khawalid had perceived that reforms and
concessions were too much, and analysts had signaled that such actions adopted by
Hamad would not be done “without confronting hardliners from the ruling family”.84
The Khawalid who represent the hardliners of the kingdom have securitized the issue
in such a way that has now “shifted towards those who conceive of the Shiite problem
in security, rather than political, terms and who continue to pursue a corresponding
security solution to what is undoubtedly a political conflict”.85 Such securitization of
an ethnic faction does indeed create and encourage a strong sense of the need to
install preventive measures both domestically and regionally to fight what has been
coined as the, “Shiite threat that is backed by Iran”.

Arguably, the securitization of the Shiite has developed over the years, and it
is rational to believe that their continued marginalization has contributed to the
radicalization of either side over the years. While reforms in the post-2002 experience
aimed at integrating the Shiite population into national politics, the differential
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treatment remained intact to a large extent. 86 It is evident that ever since the
emergence of the Al-Khalifa reign in Bahrain, sectarianism has played a role in it.
What is important for the sake of our study in this case is the securitization of the
Shiite dimension, and its emphasis as a threat by those in government. Such actions
constitute what Louër calls “Pragmatic Sectarianism”.

87

In other words, the

Shiite/Sunni divide was utilized in a time of conflict as the rhetoric changed to “the
strategic use of Shiite sectarian identity to counter the influence of Marxist and Arab
nationalist movements”. 88 Such opportunist securitization of the events by the
Bahraini Sunni leadership can be further proven by the regional political dynamics
involved. On a regional level, Saudi Arabia and Iran are perceived as the leaders of
each sect and have used religion to legitimatize their rule, and support their
counterparts elsewhere in the region.89
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With that in mind, Diwan actually argues that Bahrain’s history is not one that
reflects ongoing sectarian strife, but actually the opposite. “Within the constraints
imposed by history and geography, coexistence and even cross-sectarian cooperation
predominated, enough so that until recently Bahrain could promote itself within the
Gulf on the basis of its cosmopolitan inclusiveness, (p.144).
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Chapter 2: State-Formation trajectories and its implications on creating the
modern UAE.

Bahrain and the UAE have indeed gone through different developmental paths
throughout history. As discussed in the previous chapter, rentierism is a tool that has
been utilized by the leaders to sustain the contemporary status quo. However,
rentierism does not necessarily have an equal effect on all Gulf countries, nor does it,
alone, help us understand the current status. Focusing on the two case studies of this
thesis, this chapter aims to stress the significance of state-formation experiences and
to track its effects up to the events of the Arab Spring. Such developmental stages will
highlight also the formation of different types of elites that attach themselves
differently with the ruling class.

It is notable to acknowledge first that the gulf monarchies that we see today
are all very recent creations that were only acknowledged as states in the second half
of the past century. Previously, this Arabian Peninsula was ruled by the once powerful
Ottoman Empire. The decline of the Ottoman Empire brought about the creation of a
significant number of monarchies. As Lisa Anderson argues, the prevalence of
monarchy in the Middle East can been seen as a matter of European imperial policy
towards the region. Anderson argues that unlike other areas that the Europeans
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controlled through imperial power such as sub-Saharan Africa, imperial power had
“endowed the Middle East with an unusually large number of monarchies”. 90 The
Gulf monarchies of today appear to be homogeneous, and have indeed shared a
common history of tribal nature. The Gulf region was also found to be floating on
significant amounts of oil that was discovered at the advent of the twentieth century.
Seen as a geopolitical asset to the West, Anderson argues that “monarchies were
installed, retained, and refurbished because to a greater or lesser degree they served
European imperial purposes”. Anderson adds that the current hereditary systems that
are installed in these monarchies do not necessarily reflect the traditional tribal nature
of the gulf’s inhabitants. Rather, such new creations of nation states have made rulers
more involved and keen to take up national projects that create a sense of nationalism
to a state rather than allegiance to a certain tribe. 91 As this thesis argues, the
monarchies in the cases of Bahrain and UAE are different, and have used different
mechanisms to justify and consolidate their rule during their early stages of state
formation. Since monarchies rule in totality, it is rational to assume that they do not
adopt any type of power sharing mechanisms, or have them installed as a façade for
liberalization. As such, monarchies tend to rely on other mechanisms to retain
legitimacy such as affiliating themselves with a divine religious lineage or through
alliances with rich merchant elites who are largely influential. In other words, the
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availability of support from the traditional elite allows the monarch to enjoy voluntary
compliance. Anderson adds that the “monarchy does not provide the solution to all
the dilemmas of state formation, but its affinity with the project’s early stages may
well account for its otherwise surprising resilience in the Middle East and North
Africa”. 92

Trucial States as a Modern Creation:
British presence in the region was mainly concerned with securing the passage
to India. Despite having no formal imperial rule over the Gulf States, the British had
established a treaty to administer the territories known as Bahrain and UAE since the
early years of the 1880’s. While these treaties were initially concerned with securing
the ports and using them to export their manufactured goods worldwide, they also
came in handy with the discovery of oil in an attempt to secure access to the vast oil
supplies the region was found floating on.93 The establishment of the Gulf monarchies
in their modern form was something novel to the region and its inhabitants. No idea
of nation-state existed, but rather they were present in their tribal nature, centered by
religion as their higher authority. As Reinard Bendix explains that “the exercise of
governmental authority was an aspect of family and property. The various functions
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of government were appropriated on a hereditary basis by a governing class
consisting of king, his high officials, the magnates of the realm, and privileged
corporations which controlled their respective territories and thus ruled the country”94

It is worthy to note however that the traditional Islamic rule was not built on
family and property, but rather on religious grounds. The leader was seen as one who
would safeguard the interests and welfare of the community, while applying the
highest standards of justice and “to live in harmony with others, and to contribute its
share to the general good”.95 Such ruler did not necessarily have to be from a certain
hereditary lineage, but the one most fit and best qualified to lead (though he had to
have a minimal level of seniority).
British imperial powers had seen religion as a constraint that would hinder the ruler
since religious leaders were the source of rule in those traditionally Islamic societies.
It was the British who installed a secular leader to those newly established nation
states. To further protect and secure their interests, the British attempted to regulate
succession. “This was one of the principal aims of the British in their treaties with the
royal families of the Gulf Sheikhdoms, with the result that families who had been no
more than primus inter pares were recognized and protected as ruling families with
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dynastic rights”.96 By doing so, the British could now secure their interests through
one ruling family that they would support in exchange for a firm control over the
internal matters of the state. The ruling families of the gulf sheikhdoms today enjoy
huge autonomy from any religious institution marking a great transformation from the
traditional Islamic rule. Moreover, the dynastic families of today have successfully
incorporated religious leaders into the system, most of which are now employees of
the state, creating a much freer environment in which control by state leadership
prevails.97

Anderson goes on to suggest answers as to why monarchies in the Middle East
are somewhat successful. Part of the answer to this is found in the embryonic age of
those monarchies themselves, who have emerged as absolutist and supported by the
European imperial powers. Those new monarchies are capable of doing much under
the name of preserving the country as a whole, and more importantly engage in the
production of a sense of Nationalism “turath”98. European imperialism over the region
has contributed to such political absolutism. It weakened any form of rivalry to the
emerging monarchies, leaving them confronted with populations where local
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proletariats are virtually non-existent, and groups of elites who control the agrarian
sector do not pose any threatening challenge due to their young age.99

In the cases of Bahrain and the UAE, the above trends were applicable to
different degrees. European imperialism has indeed left its mark on the region, and in
the experiences of state formation and elites in the newly established Gulf countries.
Bahrain and the UAE are worthy of a separate analysis into their emergence patterns
and their rather different appeals to cooperate and institutionalize their rule. In each
case, it is important to analyze the demographic composition of society, and how this
has affected the state formation patterns. Each of the regimes has relied on a certain
faction for continuous support and legitimacy, and each has a different way in which
decisions are taken. One can therefore argue that the historic construction and
structure of such societies form the relationship between society and the state. Such
relationship will in turn reflect the ways in which the leadership governs, but more
importantly how it reacts to threats such as that of the Arab Spring uprisings. Not only
does state formation tell us much about the capability of each state today, but also
highlights its vulnerabilities. In doing so, one must also visit Barbra Geddes approach
to authoritarian rule and understand “who exactly are their constituents, how satisfied
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do they have to be, and what factor besides satisfaction with regime performance
affect their level of acquiescence”.100

Early Developments:
The UAE can be classified as a monarchy with a federal system of
government. Composed of seven emirates, and seven ruling families making up the
Federal National Council. Though the emirates have always been unequal in terms of
resource wealth, the UAE provides an interesting case of power sharing. Both the
UAE and Bahrain share commonalities in the pre-oil era, including trade across their
shoreline and having populations that were mostly Bedouin nomads, raising sheep
and popular for their date production. Populations of modern day UAE and Bahrain
were minimal in number and therefore had no significant centralized governments. As
mentioned before, British presence in the region led to treaties that aimed at securing
access to India, the world’s trading hub at the time. It was because of these treaties
that modern UAE was called the Trucial Coast.101 Those treaties were the starting
point of authority and recognition to the ruling family in each emirate. The British had
started to withdraw from the region towards the beginning of the 1970’s, which
brought about ongoing negotiations among the sheikhdoms to form a federation.
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Initially, Bahrain and Qatar were to be part of the federal agreement, but they
withdrew, giving birth to modern UAE composed of seven emirates.

As Herb mentions, Gulf monarchies had emerged by creating modern state
institutions and dominating them, occupying all senior posts and decision-making
centers of the state. State institutions as a concept did not exist in the Gulf in the preoil era. “This style of monarchial rule is new to the Gulf, if only because formal
ministerial governments (those with ministers of foreign affairs, defense, interior and
so forth) did not exist in the Gulf before the oil era. Before oil, and before the
possibility of the construction of large states, the ruler shared little power with other
members of his family”.102 Domination of state institutions by the ruling family was
first seen commonly in Kuwait, and most other ruling families followed. What Herb
calls “family regimes” were then followed by the systematic build-up of strong and
modern state institutions that were able to stretch their authority across the state
established boarders. Such rapid build-up was of course financed by accumulated oil
wealth, which transformed the weak states into “modern states dominated by the
ruling families”.103 In the case of the UAE, and especially in the dominant Abu Dhabi,
the consolidation of the family rule was successful after minor internal family
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conflicts between Sheikh Zayed and Shaikh Shakhbut.104 Sheikh Zayed was quick to
consolidate his rule over the oil rich Abu Dhabi in the year 1966, and then embarked
on a fully-fledged transformation scheme that would transform “Abu Dhabi into a
modern city with blinding speed”.105

In the case of the UAE, one can argue that its state formation mechanisms
were characterized by successful power sharing mechanisms.106 While it is rational to
assume that monarchies in general are vulnerable to a great extent to coups and deaths
of state leaders, this system of state formation has declared any form of coups void.
This is mainly because, so many of the family members are entrenched in the state
institutions. Succession has also been firmly regulated in the cases of Gulf monarchies
insuring smooth transition by declaring a second in line. In the case of the UAE, the
ruling families “act as an informal mechanism of representation, with various
members of the families talking to different groups in society. This gives groups in
society the sense that they have a voice within the ruling family”. 107
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Power Sharing:

If one is to analyze the political system of the UAE, it can be seen as a federal
coalition that is used to regulate and control the territory of the seven smaller
emirates. The seven emirates however have always been unequal in size, wealth and
population. Abu Dhabi is considered the wealthiest due to its significant oil reserves
(about 95% of the country’s production), and therefore the most powerful of the
emirates. Here it is important to highlight the effect of oil as the reason behind the
modern build-up of those states. The federation has indeed allowed for some
circulation of Abu Dhabi’s oil wealth among other less fortunate emirates, and Dubai
has always caught up through hegemonizing economic and political resources in an
attempt to balance out leadership in the Federation. It is worthy to emphasize the
power sharing mechanism among the emirates through the example given by Herb.
Herb describes how oil revenues are collected and redistributed among the emirates,
revenues from oil are deposited in bank accounts of individual emirates and not into a
common bank controlled by the federal government. Therefore, oil revenue
distribution is done on voluntary contributions from each emirate (probably Abu
Dhabi in this case) rather than specified quotas of some sort. In that sense, the intraemirates interaction is mostly voluntary involving some type of decision to support a
certain emirate financially. It is not a mandate of the Federation’s Supreme Council.
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Reflected in the Federation’s establishing constitution, the UAE is considered “as a
loose confederation of ruling families. The dominant political institution at the federal
level is the Supreme Council, which consists of the rulers of the seven emirates”.108

While the Supreme Council is indeed made up of the seven emirates, still the
hegemony is skewed towards Abu Dhabi and Dubai who solely enjoy a veto right
over any internal decisions. It has been custom among the Supreme Council ever
since 1971 that the president is the ruler of Abu Dhabi, and prime minister is ruler of
Dubai. The council of ministers includes members from all seven emirates distributed
among modern day ministries and institutions. As Herb describes, ministries are not
very autonomous and are influenced by the power of other emirates. Such influence
can be seen in the case of defense minister who is usually a member of the Dubai
ruling family but the actual ministry has little power; the Emirati military is
headquartered in Abu Dhabi and run by its ruling family.109

The Federal National Council (FNC) is yet another manifestation of power
sharing that exists between the emirates. The FNC is composed of appointed
individuals from each emirate to represent it in a nationwide council. Though Dubai
and Abu Dhabi are represented more (in terms of numbers) in the Council, all other
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emirates have representatives. 110 The FNC can be considered UAE’s representative
body. What is notable is that in 2006, there was a decision to allow elections to take
place among the citizens of each emirate in selecting their FNC representatives. Of
course, these elections were limited and only 6,000 hand-picked citizens were given
the right to vote by their respective ruler.111 “The method of selection was anything
but transparent, and the process inspired mostly cynicism: turnout was only 63
percent even among the handpicked electorate. In 2011, the electorate expanded to
130,000 citizens, but the elections similarly suffered from poor turnout. Press reports
did not identify any elected members who could be identified as forming an
opposition in 2006 or in 2011”.112

Many people would argue that the lack of true opposition in the UAE is due to
its oil wealth. Herb argues that oil wealth does not dictate the internal political
dynamics of Gulf states, but rather their political history does. 113 Herb provides a
comparative analysis with neighboring Kuwait saying that Kuwait has about as much
oil as the UAE, but is totally different when it comes to levels of political
participation. Similarly, the case of Bahrain, which has similar percentages of oil
revenue in GDP compared to that of UAE. Bahrain does indeed show much higher
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political activity levels, and was the most affected (in the Gulf region) during the
events of the Arab Spring in 2011. Indeed, the political history of Bahrain says much
about its current social construct, and the current sectarian divide that has been the
source of the island’s discontent for many years.

Opposition in the UAE

When looking at the UAE in general, there seems to be a distinct type of
power sharing mechanism that has not seen a parallel before. While the UAE was
indeed born out of European imperialism in the region, it has created a structure of its
own; one that is without doubt developmental, yet absolutist and dominant. As
discussed before, Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi is the one to credit for the rapid buildup
of modern UAE of course through the huge influx of oil revenues. Needless to say, oil
revenues have indeed affected each and every gulf state in a way or the other.
But can we attribute regime survival to oil? Do the Sheikhs of UAE only survive
through the traditional rentier state theory assumption of distribution? It is rational to
believe that the more money a government has, the more it is capable of suppressing
its population either through force or through buying off support. This chapter
advocates that there are other structural reasons behind the UAE’s survival and
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different distinct effects of the Arab Spring including the historic trajectories of state
formation, and elite representation.

Herb explains how ruling families in the UAE have always closely monitored
political activity. Herb adds that while the regime is not necessarily repressive, it does
not welcome political activity. Police is believed to be very active in the UAE, closely
monitoring any type of political gatherings. For instance, those who have an Islamist
orientation are usually constrained in their work easily since most citizens work with
the government in some way or the other.114

Historically, the UAE had also faced some challenges, for instance, during the
outlining the federal constitution in 1971. It is worthy to note that the Nahyan family
of Abu Dhabi and the Maktoum family of Dubai had been in struggle over the
foundational basis of the 1971 constitution. Al Nahyan consistently pushed for a
dominant role to be played by his family who was dominant in terms of finance, and
attempted to belittle the role of other smaller emirates. The Maktoum family of Dubai
had continuously attempted to avoid this imbalance, and therefore resisted such
transformation and chased different sources of wealth. Thus al-Maktoum family
transformed Dubai into a tourist destination and an international business hub that

114

Ibid., 373.
60

would prosper.

115

Such efforts were successful, and the Federation remained

unchanged in terms of power distribution between Dubai and Abu Dhabi. While this
was the last instance of attempted change from within, the Emirati citizens have
continued to show their discontent towards the huge numbers of expatriates in their
countries.116 “In the 1970’s this was a central issue in the debate over changing the
constitution; in the 1990’s it was an issue in the FNC; and today Emirati intellectuals
bemoan the irreversible tide of immigration and what they perceive to be the loss of
their countries identity” 117 While expatriate labor is indeed a topic of discontent
among the Emirati citizens, their political voice remains virtually non-existent. The
only significant opposition facing the state came about in 2012 with an attempt by a
Muslim Brotherhood group that was immediately suppressed by the regime.

Tracing the historical trajectories of the UAE as seen above indeed yields
interesting points for its state-formation. It is important to note the ways in which
conflicts were managed in the UAE. As if it appears that the rulers of the once Trucial
states had understood that the union was needed for their power and survival, and
despite the imbalance between them, they would remain together to invent a national
identity that would convert Bedouins and nomads to citizens of a modern nation state.
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Again, the management of conflict between rulers is key especially in the case of the
rivalry between Abu Dhabi and Dubai who could have easily broken the Federal
system especially at its embryonic stages. While their initial power might have been
drawn from the treaties with the British, the leaders were keen to develop a Federal
structure in which they would share a common future.
The historical trajectories of the UAE suggest no signs of political activity or
significant opposition movements that would challenge the leadership. Even the
events of the Arab Spring in 2011 that had swept across the Middle Eastern countries
had left the UAE unaffected. Specifically, the UAE had witnessed no signs of street
demonstrations; but in the climax of events in the neighboring Middle East the UAE
had witnessed a signing of a petition in “March of 2011 demanding that the FNC be
given real authority and that all citizens be allowed to vote”.118 Such petition could be
considered the climax of political discontent in the UAE during the events of the Arab
Spring. 2012 also saw the activity of a Muslim Brotherhood group who were quickly
arrested by the police along with anyone affiliated with it. The group is believed to be
very small in number and more active in the poorer emirates to the north especially
Ras al-Khaimah.119
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Unlike the UAE, Bahrain had witnessed mass protests in the center of
Manama with calls of bringing down the leadership, as we will see in the coming
chapter. As this thesis advocates, the difference can be found in areas other than oil
wealth. It is the way this oil wealth is used.
Herb suggests that “the enormous improvement in the standard of living of
Emirati citizens over the past two generations has no doubt damped down the sort of
dissent that is generated by economic hard times”.
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In other words the

developmental welfare state that was created has indeed satisfied the Emirati
population. This was a success in itself that leadership elsewhere could not attain
though they enjoyed oil wealth. In other words, rulers of the UAE were successful in
utilizing oil money to advantage their citizens, while leadership in Bahrain could not.
Such conclusion suggests that historical trajectories and social interactions in UAE
favored a successful developmental model that played to the advantage of both the
leadership and the citizens. The case of Bahrain however shows the problematic of
sectarian divide that has been the core conflict since the modern emergence of the
islands. A more important factor than the one mentioned above is indeed related to
the number of expatriate labor present in the respective country. As mentioned in the
earlier chapters, expatriate labor in the emirates account for more than 80% of the
population, making them a significant force on the national level. While expatriates
also exist in the case of Bahrain, the huge amount in UAE has given expatriates an
120
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important economic role, “UAE citizens have been reduced to a small, exceedingly
privileged minority”121 disengaging them from any type of uprising. While it might be
foreshadowed that this over dependence on huge numbers of expatriate labor might
have negative political consequences on the long run (if they collectively push for
political rights), but it is clear that political rights are highly exclusive to Emirati
citizens alone. Even though the average citizen does not have much political
influence, he does have “ a privileged claim on state resources in the form of state
employment, free education, free healthcare, housing subsidies and the like. A real
democratic revolution would threaten all of this and would threaten the Arab and
Islamic Identity of the country”.122

Government and Business Elites: policy-making and power-sharing
On a general level, Elites are usually a small number of people who organize to
control large amounts of power. In the case of politics, political elites can be
considered those leading the state and its main institutions. The power this group has
is usually a product of historical interactions and pacts between different groups
existing in a certain polity.123 In a classical work on elites, Vilfredo Pareto assumes
that in a perfect case of social mobility in any given country, elites would consist of
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the most talented individuals. In reality, elites are those who have a combination of
force and legitimacy and an inherent advantage of historical families or wealth.124
As Lester Seligman notes, elite recruitment patterns are a great indication of the
political nature in a certain country. She also highlights that there are certain criteria
that go along with elite recruitment including legitimation, eligibility, groupings and
mobility.125 In the case of Bahrain and UAE, we are confronted with two different
cases in terms of power-sharing and policy-making mechanisms.

In the case of Bahrain, instances of power-sharing were more of a mirage and were
never made tangible. In other words, the climax of power-sharing in Bahrain was seen
in the 1973 National Assembly “al-Majlis al watani” where elections were held and
people chose 30 members of parliament along the 14 others who were chosen by the
emir.126 Still any legislation passed at the time had to have the emir’s approval, which
implied that he had veto power at any time. The parliament could also veto any royal
decrees by a 2/3 majority. This was actually the case when the emir tried to pass a
decree giving substantial power to State Security Law; this power struggle ended by
the emir dissolving parliament in 1975. The next experiment – the setting up of
cabinet – was also an indicator of political elite dominance over power. The cabinet
had consisted of 1/3 Shiite 1/3 Sunni and a 1/3 from the ruling family. Again, power
was skewed towards the Sunni royal family since Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa
(brother of Emir Isa) has led the cabinet since its inception, as well as holding onto
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key ministries such as those of interior, defense, justice, finance and the state
budget. 127 As events unfolded, Bahraini leadership continued to issue decrees and
laws that would favor the ruling family. Even after Emir Isa’s passing, his son Hamad
continued on the same footsteps, and even sidelining more the role of Shiites after the
Iranian revolution and spread of radical sentiments in the region. The 2001-statesponsored National Action Charter and the 2002-constitution showed no signs of
power-sharing, and more importantly entrenching power in the hands of Al-Khalifa,
and the 2002 constitution turned the legislative body into a consultative one.128
The Bahraini leadership has continued to portray the Shiite minorities as a threat and
containing them has been the priority. The council of representative’s elections in
2002, 2006, and 2010 have continued to under-represent the Shiite majority
population.

Ruling elites in the case of the UAE are different in the very nature of it being a
federal system of government. Compromise and the willingness to cooperate was at
the core of a successful union in 1971 especially between the famous Al-Nahyan and
Al-Maktoum families. The Federal National Council is the only manifestation of
power sharing and policy making in the UAE. Comprised of 40 members from the
different emirates, 20 are elected and 20 are appointed by the respective emirate
leader.129 Sheikh Khalifa ben Zayed al-Nahyan saw that the FNC will continue to play
a crucial role to accommodate the issues affecting citizens.
The system of power-sharing in that case was built on the concept of Shura policy of
consultations and discussion. While the power sharing mechanism among the elite in
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UAE has been a success, political activity has been very limited in to the scope of
FNC with no history of political activism. It is an obvious choice that the leadership
has continued to take avoiding any distress arising from political unrest especially
within the context of regional unrest.

State-society relations in the business sector are key indicators of elite arrangements
and their location relative to leadership. It is also a significant indicator of regime
resilience. According to Marc Valeri, the degree of proximity and independence of
the business elite (who are all members of the Sunni minority) is indicative of the
degree of reform and shapes the economic policy set forth by the state. To access the
role of elite in these societies, it is crucial to look at the situation within the context of
pre-oil and post-oil eras.130

In Bahrain, the popular merchant elites were part of the pre-oil pearling industry, and
Al-Khalifa had the power to control those merchant elites, through control of their
agricultural land in return for protection. The merchant families in the case of Bahrain
had been an important player until the discovery of oil in the 50’s. The shift here is
integral because oil wealth now gave the state the luxury of economic independence
forcing the merchant families out of the decision/participation equation. The
perceived era of economic liberalization foreshadowed economic diversification and
true competition to open up markets and enhance the private sector as a leader of
change. The decreased role of business owners brought about a much weaker private
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sector that lined up with the leadership, this in turn divided and reduced their
capability to act freely relative to the ruling elite.

The cases of UAE and Bahrain show clear distinctions in the oil-era. In the case of
Bahrain, the era of economic liberalization or growth of private sector was aborted in
its early stages with rebirth of economic and political ties with historic families in
proximity Al-Khalifa. As Valeri narrates, Al-Khalifa controlled most of the islands
land, as well as a percentage of any contracts signed on the island. The Al-Khalifa
family had no monitoring bodies to hold him accountable since the dissolving of the
1975 parliament. The recent history of Bahrain shows that only two people from
outside the ruling family held positions in the government, coming namely from the
Urayyad and Fakhro families.131 As one can assume, these are rich merchant families
that were in great proximity with Al-Khalifa family since the discovery of oil.

With that mindset, the Al-Khalifa family showed no signs of economic diversification
or intention of reform. It is also the acceptance of the business elite of the status quo,
and the preference of staying as “rent seekers” than reformists. It might have also
been the case that merchant elites of the pre-oil era had lost their organizational
capacity and could no longer pose a threat to the regime itself. 132

The case of UAE is rather different, and the transition made possible by oil is
significant. The transformation of the UAE can be seen in all forms of life from
infrastructure to modern lifestyle and a major business hub. Emirates such as Dubai
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have also championed initiatives of economic diversification and has been an
attractive home to foreign direct investments and tourism, and hence became less
reliant on oil as years’ progress. 133 Elite arrangements in the case of UAE are
completely different from that of Bahrain, in the sense that it was the state of UAE
that championed and led the process of economic diversification. The state-sponsored
economic liberalization brought about no representation and no institutionalization
creating the contemporary capitalist form. 134 This was of course coupled by increased
consumption and a huge foreign population, nearly four times the size of the native
population. This rendered the public sector and any aspiration for reform irrelevant.

As previously mentioned, the UAE remains a symbol of cooperation despite
conflicts between the Nayhan and Maktoum families that could have ended with
separation as early as 1971, if either of the two sides was not eager to compromise.
That being said, the UAE shows a sign of successful power sharing, and the
application of customary rules to divide power across the seven emirates. The main
manifestation of such power sharing could be seen in the FNC and the Supreme
Council of Ministers. While the imbalance remains, the UAE has chosen to remain as
one. Readily available through oil revenues, the UAE had immediately chosen to
embark on a nation-building scheme that would advantage their citizens and coin
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them as a privileged minority. Such privileged minority is indeed closely monitored
through public sector employment to avoid any unwanted political activity. Such
system was put into test as the recent events of the Arab Spring unfolded. While there
were minor calls for reform in the UAE advocating for a more representative FNC,
these calls were quick to end, leaving the UAE unaffected. Huge differences are seen
when comparing Bahrain and UAE when it comes to political stability during the
events of the Arab Spring and its aftermath. Figure 1 below shows each country’s
ranking between the years 2010-2015 in terms of political stability on a score range of
-2.5 (Instability) to + 2.5 (stability). The inverted graph immediately shows difference
among vulnerability of each regime to the events of the Arab Spring. By definition,
this indicator also measures “the absence of violence” and the probability of political
unrest or politically motivated violence.
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The events of the popular Pearl

Roundabout in 2011 continued to decrease political instability through 2013 despite
neighboring Saudi Arabia’s attempts to crush and contain the uprisings. UAE on the
other hand remained relatively stable with slight changes to which the UAE
leadership easily contained.
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Figure 1: Political Stability Estimate: Worldwide Governance Indicators

Source: Worldwide Government Indicators (The World Bank).
Figure 2 below also shows government effectiveness indicator that highlights the
extent to which government is successful in providing good quality of public services,
civil service, independence from political pressures, policy formation and credibility
of government commitment to such policies.136 This graph also shows a significant
difference between the cases of Bahrain and UAE, especially in accessing public
opinion towards government. Bahrain marks slight improvements that can be
attributed to GCC supports in terms of patronage and reallocation of resources to
suppress the uprising by offering more to the public. Improvements in UAE echo
what was mentioned earlier by Almezani in the inclusion of elites in patronage
networks that are able to distribute wealth as well as access to better services usually
welfare.
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Figure 2: Government Effectiveness Estimate: Worldwide Government
Indicators.
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Source: Worldwide Government Indicators (The World Bank).

Though Bahrain has witnessed similar events under British control prior to the
oil era, the island has indeed witnessed a totally different historic trajectory. The
following chapter will aim at tracking the differences in the case of Bahrain. What is
worthy to note is Bahrain’s leadership and its emergence as a dominant force on the
island. Such dominant Sunni minority had enforced order over the indigenous Shiite
majority, and in turn involving the British more in the internal affairs of the country.
Unlike the UAE, The Khalifa family of Bahrain had also faced several challenges
with the status of elites who already existed on the island and benefited from the
harvest as well as the popular pearling industry. A significant difference that one can
detect right away is that the Khalifa family had emerged on an already existing
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system. Changing such system has been at the core of dispute yielding a different
outcome for Bahrain relative to that of the UAE even before the discovery of oil.
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Chapter 3: The Challenges of Power-Sharing and its Effects on
Contemporary Bahrain.

The Kingdom of Bahrain, as formally known today, has witnessed significant
events over the past couple of years that are worthy of attention. The recent events of
the Arab Spring have hit Bahrain the most among the GCC countries. Though most of
the GCC countries appear similar at a first glance, this thesis has stressed on their
internal differences. Such differences have been attributed to non-uniform historical
trajectories of state formation and elite interactions. The previous chapter highlighted
the paths underwent by the UAE during the early stages of autonomy from the British,
mainly characterized by cooperation and different power-sharing mechanisms vested
in the federal system they have until today.

In an attempt to find reasoning behind the different effects of the so-called
Arab spring on the Gulf States, this chapter aims at situating Bahrain into perspective
relative to its regional counterparts. Similar to the previous analysis on UAE, sociohistoric trajectories will be the focal point of this chapter, as well as elite interactions.
It is worth noting that among the GCC countries, Bahrain had seen the highest levels
of political activity, and calls for the change in regime were advocated. Though such
political activity was quickly brought to an end, there are important political
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connotations that must not go unanalyzed. Historic trajectories and interactions in
state formation explain why political mobilization materialized in Bahrain and not in
neighboring UAE. As the analysis in this chapter will show, elite domination and
coercion fuelled such political discontent.

Bahrain in regional perspective:

Similar to the UAE, Bahrain was another island that was controlled by the
British. Bahrain had been under effective control by the British as early as 1880
through a treaty, which effectively controlled the island until its independence in
1971. 137 Though British control over the UAE was limited to securing pathways to
India and later the security of the vast oil reserves of the region, Bahrain was
significantly different and experienced much more British involvement.

Similar to most of the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula, inhabitants of
modern day Bahrain were of tribal nature. The al-Khalifa tribe would emerge on the
island in the late 18th century in an attempt to establish their rule and control the
island.138 As Khallaf describes, it took just under a century of continuous struggle
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until al-Khalifa family was able to consolidate its rule. Specifically in 1870, alKhalifa was able to control the island through a prolonged series of land confiscation
and a redistribution among those who lined up with his alliance, causing lands to be
divided “into a network of small fiefdoms, moqata‘at”.139 It is important to note that
al-Khalifa family was predominantly Sunni Muslims who came to control an
indigenous Shiite population that inhabited the island. These fiefdoms were basically
a system of dividing the people into smaller geographical groups, with the leader
“fief” acting as the administrator to such estate, and appointing intermediaries to
manage the economic activity which at the time depended mainly on agriculture and
fishing. In the words of Khallaf, “these agents played a dual intermediary role: they
were agents of ‘exogenous’ landlords; and, they were patrons of ‘indigenous’
peasants.140

Bahrain’s history suggests right away two main differences relative to the
UAE. First was the idea that Bahrain came into being with the consolidation of alKhalifa rule over the island. Their emergence involved physical control over the
indigenous population and as stated above, took just under a century to consolidate.
Such instability has required from the British more interference in the internal affairs
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of the island more than anywhere else in the Gulf.141 Secondly was the unfavorable
sustenance of internal divide within al-Khalifa family and dispute among the
hardliners and those in power from the ruling elite have continued until this very day.

British involvement in Bahrain was crucial for maintaining order over the
island and securing British access to Indian ports. The island’s significance was
coupled by the recognition of al-Khalifa tribe by the British by signing treaties to
regulate trade and passage of vessels.142 Khallaf narrates how the British were the
backbone of al-Khalifa rule, especially in its embryonic stages, “ Britain deployed its
forces to quell internal clashes or ward off external foes of al-Khalifa. British support,
particularly since 1869, will continue to be the major resource for the regime, for its
protection, stability and prosperity”.143 Differently from the norm elsewhere in the
Gulf, al-Khalifa family were not able to normalize relationship with the subject
population. In other words, Bahrain was unable to develop into becoming a unified
entity with a homogeneous population, but rather al-Khalifa continue to guard their
identity/image as ‘settlers-rulers’. However, their ‘tribal’ backgrounds and identity
have not been static. The al-Khalifa conquest of 1783 continues to be commemorated
by the ruling family on a yearly basis, with major buildings and roads on the island
141
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carry the names of the imitators and contributors. Moreover, the conquest has been
integrated into schoolbooks and has been celebrated in special festivals, confirming
all the negative allegations targeted at al-Khalifa, and confirming how the Shiite
frame them as conquerors. 144

In comparative perspective, one can emphasize here the different sociohistoric process of which Bahrain and the UAE emerged. Though both modern states
emerged from a similar shared tribal nature, their state-formation trajectories were
clearly different. Both had come into emergence with relying to a great extent on
British recognition and support. The actions by the leader of each tribe were
inherently different. Both cases embarked on a system of state building that would
require the breaking down of social barriers and a transformation into becoming a
more homogeneous society. As discussed in the previous chapter, the UAE was
successful to a great extent in bringing down social barriers and securing a federal
constitution that entailed power sharing among the different emirates. Though the
smaller emirates suffered from unequal resources, the bigger emirates were successful
in managing any problems that would arise out of this resource gap – they simply
understood problems that would arise, that with their unity came their strength.
UAE’s success was not paralleled by the leadership in Bahrain, giving the UAE an
edge over Bahrain in a critical time of state formation. Though none of these tribal
144
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societies smoothly emerged into their modern form, or without turbulent periods of
feuds, alliances and compromise to reach their modern form of state-building. UAE
leadership managed much better. The case of Al-Khalifa in Bahrain was one that
reflected a huge failure to assimilate and accommodate the needs of the subject
population, which created a sense of floundering between leadership and population,
and consequently lacked in significant state building efforts.145

The consolidation of al-Khalifa:
As mentioned above, the consolidation of al-Khalifa rule came by their influx
over the island and the control over agricultural land. Agricultural land was divided
into estates that were controlled and administered by members of the ruling family.
The emergence of al-Khalifa came at a time when indigenous Bahraini citizens
depended on pearl trading, a sector considered led by rich merchant elites who held
considerable power in the pre-oil era. 146 It is rational to assume that such notable
merchant elites would not appreciate the emergence of oil wealth that would be
controlled by the ruling family. While the discovery of oil brought about tighter
control of al-Khalifa over the island, Bahrain had witnessed internal developments
that were unprecedented emphasizing al-Khalifa’s right to rule that was based on
conquest and domination of state resources. With such actions came unrest from
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discontented pearl divers and peasants of the island in an attempt to resist sociopolitical change through non-compliance and sabotage.147 While these actions were
short-lived and did not initiate much change “they can, on occasions, undermine the
legitimacy, stability and productivity of the system to the point that power elites feel
the need to institute some significant reforms” 148 . In order to keep the system
functioning the British had to become increasingly involved.

With the arrival of oil discovery in the twentieth century, the British saw the
increasing need to establish certain reforms to consolidate al-Khalifa rule initiating
four major developments. Firstly was the attempt by the British to create a local
administration. Such administration would be more formal and would eradicate the
system of fiefdoms. Such administration would now be responsible to “maintain
public order, collecting taxes, and allocating accrued oil revenues and custom
duties”. 149 Oil companies constituted a new destination that would attract various
types of labor including former pearl divers and peasants, more importantly was the
fact that no sectarian divide existed with Sunni and Shiite workers working side by
side. 150 Such societal transformation was made viable by the cooptation of the Shiite
clergy and the previously rich merchant elites, who remained in support of al147
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Khalifa.151 This process can be seen as the transformation from tribal community to a
more modern state. As Diwan describes “tribal chiefs became government officials
and religious jurists became state judges, all with fixed salaries. At the top of this
system remained al-Khalifa who soon assumed control over all the states sovereign
ministries and its growing oil revenues. 152

The second development that was initiated by the British in an attempt to
consolidate the rule of al-Khalifa was an administrative arrangement that would allow
substantial flows of oil reserves directly to the “piggy bank” of al-Khalifa, precisely
one third of oil revenues. 153 The development of the oil industry brought about tighter
control over the state resources by al-Khalifa. Similar to the case of the UAE and
other classical rentier economies, oil grants its beholder a distributive capacity by
which the leadership can buy off its supporters and ensure internal stability. Though
oversimplified, oil in the case of Bahrain was also subjected to distribution to account
for the ongoing social transformations. As this thesis has advocated from the
beginning, the effects of oil cannot be disregarded, but they are not sufficient to
provide an explanation of events alone. The process of integrating previous members
of society was made readily available with oil. This was seen in “the emergence of a
stratum of entrepreneurs, middlemen, bureaucrats, and professionals who were
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recruited by the oil industry and the government from among the pearl merchant and
other notable families of the main towns, Manama and Muharraq”.154 Manama and
Muharraq emerged as the two main cities of Bahrain with major ports and central
administration crucial for the islands trade and power consolidation.155

The final development was seen in a foundational problem of societies: ethnic divide.
i.e. the ability (or lack thereof) members of ethnic divisions to work side by side.156
This was indeed a development that did not occur ever-since the Sunni conquest of
the island in the late 18th century. Recent Bahraini history has been shaped by British
to mitigate this ethnic divide. As Khallaf describes it “It is, in part, a history of
ongoing, yet faltering, process of de-ethnification and nation-and state-building”.157
The socio-historic approach to Bahrain yields an ongoing process of attempting to
break loose of ethnic affiliations whether them being, tribal or religious. Khuri coins it
as an ongoing attempt of enlightenment that “meant rejecting sectarian politics,
opposing colonial rule and the tribally controlled regime, and championing the cause
of labor classes”158.
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Though these policies favor stability and signal a more accepting Bahraini
society, this was not necessarily the outcome. Khalaf describes a form of “divide and
rule” approach adopted by al-Khalifa family, or what he calls vertical segmentation.
Vertical segmentation describes the process of society separation in which al-Khalifa
family had invested into sustaining and continues to benefit from its divided frontiers.
“vertical segmentation, in Bahrain, is maintained through mobilization of tribal,
confessional, and ethnic myths, through appropriate parts of communal histories,
through cooptation as well as through actual use of physical force”.159 Immediately
when analyzing Bahrain, the Sunni/Shiite divide has been the most prevalent and
sustained. While other differences existed, among them being wealth, tribal origins,
religious sectarianism remains the highlight of Bahraini politics until this very day.
Sustaining this divide has been the main goal of the regime in an ongoing attempt to
prevent any interactions or grouping among those societal sects. As such, Khallaf
narrates that “long before it assumed its control of modern sources of rent and
extraction of wealth, al-Khalifa were able to monopolize use of force in the territory,
mediate among tribal and confessional hierarchies, and impose their segmented coexistence”.160
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Emphasizing the sectarian divide:

As mentioned above, the creation of oil allowed al-Khalifa family a tighter
control over the Bahraini society. With their ongoing tactics of vertical segmentation,
the traditional elite had declined with the end of the pearl industry or moved into
business with al-Khalifa or with the elite community of merchants in Manama. 161
In the meantime, Shiite villages were left unattended for in terms of general state
building and development. While some of the peasants turned into wage workers and
served the increasing rise of urban Manama, others remained underprivileged and
“were transformed into bedroom communities for labor in the new industries, they
maintained a strong communal base”. 162 The regular marginalization of Shiite
communities allowed them to unite behind the cause, however little was there for
them to do due to their scattered nature. This dispersion however did not continue for
long since the decades of the 1950’s and the 1970’s saw a rise of nationalist
movements elsewhere in the Arab world that were exported to Bahrain. Nationalist
movements were more effective in the capital of Manama which was “spurred by
leftist ideologies and Arab nationalism, managed to forge alliances with the villagebased movements on the grounds of shared economic interests and demands for
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greater political accountability”. 163 Systematic Shiite differential treatment continued
as the developmental state seemed to only target the urban centers of Manama and
Muharraq. The rise in oil prices in the 1970’s also saw another rise of the state’s
welfare role, and expanding its clientelistic role by providing access to public land
readily available to Sunni and Shiite commercial elite. Still however differential
treatment was evident in maintaining/consolidating certain structural inequalities,
with the neglect of the Shiite rural villages being on top of the list.164 Employment in
the public sector was accessible more to those who had social connections who were
by nature predominantly Sunni and mostly urban communities. Such huge gap
between urban and rural (predominantly Shiite) communities left the masses
vulnerable to any radical exogenous ideologies such as that of the Iranian revolution
in 1979.165
As commonly perceived, the sectarian imbalance in the case of Bahrain has usually
been the source of problems in the islands. Especially with a monarchy representing
the Sunni minority, and a Shiite population between 400,000 to 500,000 people in
2009, accounting to between 65% to 75% of total population.166 What is worthy to
note is the Shi’i minority in the case of the UAE “comprising about 15 percent of the
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total citizen population”.167 Existing on a much smaller scale, Shiite minorities in the
UAE are minimal compared to other parts in the region with not much tangible
repression, but rather have “long benefited from the patronage of the rulers”. 168
Similarly, civil society groups do not contribute much to political activity or
materialize to form organizations. More active civil society groups in the UAE are
more concerned primarily with business activity as well as sports clubs.

It is crucial at this level to take a step back and highlight a few aspects in such
context. While it was evident that the Sunni and Shiite communities of Bahrain had
received different treatment by the leadership, it was the lack of development and the
inability of the rural population to follow in the footsteps of Manama that was
mourned. In other words, the Shiite community did not necessarily complain and try
to mobilize because they were Shiite, but because they did not enjoy the luxuries of
the welfare state that was felt by the more fortunate. As such the Shiite mobilization
was a product of “vertical segmentation” advocated by al-Khalifa. Continuous
dividing of the society saw the creation of the first coalition known as the Higher
Executive Committee (HEC) in the light of nationalist movements taking place
elsewhere across the Middle East. The HEC was established after a series of
movements advocated by clubs against the British presence in Bahrain as well as the
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absolutist control of al-Khalifa. The HEC would set a precedent as an organized
group composed of Sunni and Shiite representatives alike and calling for a list of
reforms from al-Khalifa. 169 These reforms called for: the election of a legislative
council, the adoption of a system for criminal and civil laws, the establishment of
trade unions and the call for appointment of a court of appeals. While the HEC made
it clear that these calls did not affect the status of the ruler, the talks with the regime
failed. However, the HEC had achieved two very important gains: the establishment
of general trade unions and the recognition as an official independent political
organization.170 The HEC was seen as the first challenge to al-Khalifa after the partial
withdrawal of the British into Bahraini affairs. The HEC was popular and spread
across the island harvesting support of more than 6000 workers and was seen as more
and more problematic by the leadership. The power of the HEC can be measured by
its successful attempt “to stem Sunni-Shiite conflict in the 1950s and the coalition
voting of the leftist People’s Bloc and the Religious Bloc in the 1973 parliament, a
challenge to the government which led directly to the parliament’s dissolution. 171

Again, it is important to step back and analyze the context in which
mobilization was born. Since the gradual handing over of the Bahraini affairs by the
British to al-Khalifa, the strive of the lower class has been a socio-economic one. It
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was al-Khalifa who have continuously emphasized the strategy of sectarian divide and
targeted the more urban centers where mostly Sunnis benefited from the welfare state.
The impoverished Shiites of rural Bahrain had continuously advocated for working
rights. The HEC was an example bringing together both Sunni and Shiite workers
calling for their rights as workers and a more equal representation to balance out alKhalifa’s authoritarian rule.

The start of the 1980’s brought about religious mobilization that was exported
from neighboring Iran. Interestingly enough, religious mobilization found ground
among the urban Shiite “who followed Hojjat al-Islam Hadi al-Mudarrisi, a cleric
from Iraq associated with Shirazi Islamic Action Organization who was granted
Bahraini citizenship in 1974”.172 Such organization had fed off continuous differential
socio-economic treatment among the Shiite population and later formed the Islamic
Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) which was later accused of attempting to
overthrow al-Khalifa family in 1981. 173 Such attempts would later elicit a drastic
reaction from al-Khalifa, eliminating any Shiite from jobs in the military and police as
well as all sovereign ministries, deliberately denying the Shiite population any
powerful job. 174 After being prevented from employment opportunities in a large
share of the country’s public sector, the Shiite population were quick to look for
172
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employment in the private sector where much lower-wage workers and expatriates
occupied the market. The inability for the Shiite population to find a job gave rise to
yet another wave of political mobilization among the working classes who “took to
the streets, feeding the village uprisings of the mid-1990’s. Even more threatening for
the al-Khalifa was the reappearance of cross-sectarian political cooperation at this
time in the form of petitions demanding the reinstatement of the parliament”

.175

The island was now left with discontented masses that were able to effectively
mobilize. Mobilization was now explicitly done on a religious sect basis. This is to
emphasize again that the movements called for better access to jobs and equal
opportunity in terms of employment; in other words, the plea was not explicitly
religious. This was also confirmed by Sunni-based mobilization that materialized
among the urban community of Muharraq. Supported by proxy from neighboring
Saudi Arabia, the Shiite movement was much smaller in magnitude relative to that of
the Sunni community because the “Muslim Brotherhood in Bahrain was associated
with from its origins with a notable al-Khalifa sheikh, Khalid bin Muhammed alKhalifa” meaning that the movement was less independent and had a much smaller
effect in challenging the ruling family.176
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By the end of the 1990’s al-Khalifa family was strongly challenged and had
faced significant civil unrest and internal weakness reflected in their declining
economy and weakening political system. Similar to their historical dependence on
Britain for normalizing disputes and interfering in favor of consolidating power to alKhalifa, Bahrain would now turn to neighboring Saudi Arabia as a source of multiple
support, and at times asked for Saudi National Guard troops to domestically bolster
al-Khalifa. 177 This was a pattern that we will later see happen in 2011’s pearl
roundabout.

The events of the 1990’s had left the island exhausted in terms of financial
capabilities as well as a need of some type of reform to avoid this ongoing struggle.
The succession of Emir Hamad in 1999 brought about a change in the leadership, not
necessarily better, but rather different. Championing the idea of reform, King Hamad
brought about a national project coined as “the National Action Charter” that aimed at
diversifying employment opportunities among the population and decreasing the
amount of foreign labor, opening up the job market to absorb more domestic workers
among them were Shiites; he adopted “controlled liberalization”.178 It was an attempt
to normalize the relationship with the Shiite population without compromising the
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power of al-Khalifa. Such reconciliation with the Shiite groups was seen in “the
coming together of most of the Shiite opposition into a unified alliance – al-Wifaq, or
the Islamic National Accord”.179 King Hamad promised the return to parliamentary
life in Bahraini politics. With the return of parliament in 2002, Kind Hamad insured
that Shiite majorities did not control much of the decision-making process; this led to
the opposition boycotting the elections while others still participated in an attempt to
initiate change from within. The Crowne Prince would also adopt a reformist policy
along the line of King Hamad, one that was more concerned with economic
modernization and development in an attempt to follow in the footsteps of
neighboring Gulf countries.

The rise of “true” Sectarianism and the events of 2011

Attempts by King Hamad and Crowned Prince Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa
to reconcile with the marginalized Shiite communities were short lived and quickly
came to a halt. Confronted by the regime hardliners vested in Prime Minister Sheikh
Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, and the Khawalid sect – who control the Defense
Ministry- had prevailed when dealing with the 2011 uprising. 180 The Khawalid had
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come to rise ideologically at a time when neighboring Iraq saw the success of a Shiite
regime. Their rise was fueled by “regional discourse of Sunni victimization, Shiite
savagery, and American deceit gained traction through the months of escalating
sectarian civil war in Iraq”. 181 Bahraini leadership, and especially in this case the
Khawalid, were quick to oppose the idea of reform and any form of power sharing
with the opposition. The events of 2011 came at a time where internal disputes existed
on all fronts, on one end the attempt by King Hamad and Prince Salman to initiate
reforms and normalize tense societal relationships over the previous decades, and on
the other the confrontation with internal family struggles posed by al- Khawalid.
It was the youth activists that advocated the initial calls for demonstration; the
legal opposition was quick to join the protests as part of the domino effect that swept
the region. The divide was evident with the regimes violent response to the peaceful
demonstrations. “Popular anger at the ‘tribal privilege at the heart of the boom
economy was in full evidence in the protest sites chosen by the street opposition”. 182
While many occupied the pearl roundabout in Manama, younger generations headed
to more symbolic places such as Bahrain’s financial harbor and the royal court which
was the backbone of the ruling al-Khalifa family.
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Al-Khalifa family was quick to condemn the uprisings and acted violently, the
crown prince openly asked for negotiations with the formal opposition, and agreeing
to removal of the Khawalid minister of cabinet affairs from his post. The opposition
was quick to call for the ousting of the Prime Minister, but such calls were met with
counter-mobilizations on the part of some Sunnis with bloody confrontations in front
of Bahraini leadership buildings. The next day before the intervention of the “Gulf
Cooperation Council Peninsula Shield Forces”, led by the Saudi Arabian National
Guard, crossed the causeway, ending the uprising.

The socio-historic trajectories of Bahrain and its state formation experiences
tell us much about the Bahraini society and the way it came into being. Similar to
what has been argued in the case of UAE, oil rents have been a reoccurring resource
that has facilitated the execution of certain national projects or political initiatives
adopted by the regime. What oil has not done in this case is to insure the sustenance
of the regime. Regardless of its abundance, the process of state formation in Bahrain
and its progressive nature has yielded a more politically active society by nature. The
nature of its emergence since the 18th century has involved physical force on behalf of
the Sunni settlers over the Shiite indigenous population. Though the Sunni/Shiite
divide cannot be disregarded, this chapter has argued that the history of the struggle
was not necessarily religious but more dependent on the policies adopted at the top. In
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most instances of Shiite mobilization, especially before the 1990’s, the group was
advocating for better access to jobs and equal opportunity to those living in the urban
capital of Manama. Elite policies have played a more prominent role in the history of
Bahraini conflict. The Khawalid have indeed coined themselves as al-Khalifa
hardliners with no compromise or power sharing. With the advent of the wave of
political reform by prince Salman, a series of disputes and internal divides among the
ruling elite would prevail and obstruct power sharing.

While the sectarian divide remained, a tactic deployed by al-Khalifa in the early
decades of state-formation (during this vertical segmentation approach), it can be
argued that sectarianism dug its roots into the Bahraini society with the Islamic
Revolution taking place in neighboring Iran. Not only were groups established on
religious sect basis such as that of al-Wifaq or the Islamic National Accord, but also
followed by regime hardliners opposing any compromises with Shiite minorities. True
sectarian divide intensified and prevailed when the Shiite populations of the region
gained power in Iran and Iraq, which made al-Khalifa leadership –hardliners
especially- feel even more a true threat from their Shiite population.
In one of the very few opinion surveys conducted in the Bahrain, Gengler
provides a detailed study of the securitization of Shiite threat. Survey data suggests
that there are imbalances in access to public goods and services between Sunni and
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Shiite even after balancing out the effects of individual-level variables and influences.
Only as an example, data suggests that a Sunni Bahraini is 56% more likely to be
employed in the public sector, compared to a Shiite Bahraini of same gender, age,
education and marital status. This pattern is more prevalent towards those at the lower
end

of

the

educational

spectrum.

183

Only

do

Shiite

with

high

level

education/certificates can Sunni equivalent employment. The other 35-40% of Shiite
who have a secondary terminal education or less experience inequality and it is a
proven quantitative reality.184

Justin Gengler, “Rentier Theory and Rentier Reality” in Group Conflict and
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Conclusion - Divergent Paths Explained: Bahrain and the UAE.
The popular and influential concept of rentier states has been at the core of this thesis
especially contesting its over-generalization as an explanatory framework.
Comparing the cases of Bahrain and United Arab Emirates, this thesis has adopted a
socio-historic approach to analyze state-formation, types of elites and the sectarian
structure in each country. This thesis was born out of the different events that Bahrain
and UAE experienced during the 2011 Arab Spring. The connotation of “the Gulf
States (GCC)” has implied that the six countries are uniform on the political,
economic and social level. Rightly so, these countries do share a number of
commonalities. However, they also differ dramatically when it comes to historical
experiences of state formation, and internal group dynamics. As this thesis argues,
these dynamics have been at the core of explaining why the cases of Bahrain and
UAE experienced different outcomes during the events of the 2011-Arab Spring.

This thesis has proposed a revision of the traditional Rentier state definition of
resource extraction and distribution, and the no taxation/no representation policy.
Rather it has proposed a more case-specific approach that is more indicative of
internal group dynamics. Not everything started with oil. One of the main additions of
the specialized and conditional rentier state model proposed here is the movement
away from the state-centric approach. Following recent research, the thesis proposes
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that the state can never be detached from society, where the idea of violent uprisings
can be present. In an increasingly globalized world, the state must do more than
repress or buy off society. 185 Earlier Rentier state theory has also fallen short to
predict the diversification waves that emirates like Dubai and Abu Dhabi had
embarked on in the early years of the 1990’s and 2000’s. These emirates have
purposely installed diversification schemes and reforms away from oil by opening up
their economies to international markets and attracting investments. By doing so,
Dubai was quick to absorb major international corporations and businesses turning
itself into an international business hub. On the level of the citizens (and expatriates),
this opening up has allowed for abundant business and educational opportunities.186 It
is of course logical to assume that at the center of the state’s thinking during these
reforms was the idea of survival. While traditional rentier state theory has correctly
assumed that oil-rich states will continue to resist democratization, it fell short in
highlighting that the state “must still be responsive to society if –as it has done in the
past decades- it wants to ensure long–term survival”.187

It is important to emphasize that this thesis does not advocate to do completely
without the rentier state theory, but rather advocates a modified version that locates it
within a series of explanatory variables highlighting its evolutionary contribution. In
185
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other words, this thesis lines up with Gary’s proposed approach to consider rentierism
as only one aspect of the explanation rather than being a full-fledged exclusive
explanatory framework that applies to a wide spectrum of rentier regimes. Several
Gulf scholars have also echoed the idea of modified rentierism in their works.188

Matthew Gray has proposed some type of diagnosis to features of laterentierism that have taken place since the 1990’s and early 2000’s in Gulf
monarchies. This decade marked a change in spending strategy and marked the start
of a process to diversify the economy and move more towards long-term
sustainability. Gray rightly argues that Gulf states moved towards being more
supportive of development and also more responsive than before. While it was a
movement away from the classical rentier state model, some of the core ideas
remained: “in none of these states has there been a dramatic transition to a pluralistic
or Western-style democracy”. 189 This is why this thesis did not propose doing away
altogether with Rentier state theory. The analysis of the two cases in this thesis shows,
that Rentier state theory has been valid in explaining how Bahrain, UAE and other oil
wealthy states act, especially in times of discontent, at least by using available
resources to cope with such discontent. It is easy to see immediate shifts in spending
188
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strategies such as those done by the UAE during the events of 2011. Saudi influence
in Bahrain was also apparent and actually crucial in maintaining the regime’s survival
in 2011.
As this thesis has mentioned before, the welfare state in the UAE was made available
by oil rents. Most important here is the recognition that it was a state leadership
decision to utilize oil money to benefit their citizens. The historical trajectories and
social interactions in UAE favored a successful developmental model that played to
the advantage of both the leadership and the citizens. This, on the other hand, did not
materialize in the case of Bahrain.

In line with the findings of this thesis, recent research on rentierism suggests
“features of a late rentier state”. 190 These features are at present emerging after a
process of transformation over the past two decades. The first thing is the fact that oil
has created a responsive state though still politically undemocratic. It is true that in
the example of UAE, the state is providing international standards when it comes to
education, healthcare and other privileges to their citizens and can sometimes be
offered free of charge. This comes with limitations when it comes to certain freedoms
that are related to politics, or other recent technologies that can undermine the state’s
control.

190
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The rentier effect here is slightly transformed because the UAE was capable of
financing its welfare state and stay responsive to its federal components by the money
made readily available mostly through oil.

The second feature of “late rentierism” was opening up to globalization but
with some protectionism.191 This characteristic was very evident again in the case of
UAE where it exploited globalization to become an international business hub and a
center to many modern cooperation’s. This was done, on the other hand, with extreme
caution. Dubai in this case was a model of success, it transferred its wealthy classes
into engaging with more opportunities in “stocks, property trade, and work as senior
government officials, business intermediaries, and investors”.192 It is still important to
highlight the fact that in the case of UAE it was the historic and social interactions
that existed at the time of oil’s discovery that set the stage for Dubai to emerge as it
has today. In other words, it was the utilization of the oil money by the leaders and
their decision to diversify the economy that created modern Dubai. It was a decision
taken to shift from the usage of oil money as consumption-based economy, to one that
is more diversified and focuses on the core of state building. This is what Gray coins
as an active economic and developmental model. This also demonstrates the
importance of the type of elite and policy-making – as mentioned above.

191
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One of the most important points to consider when going into further research
on the gulf countries and their comparative similarities/differences is the significant
transformation that has happened over the years in terms of political economy. The
1960’s through to the 80’s were a period of significant reliance on oil in the economy,
with oil constituting a huge percentage of GDP of gulf countries. But there has been a
movement towards some transformation. It is a movement that Gray describes as a
movement from “energy-centric” to “energy-driven and energy-underwritten”
economies. 193 Such transformation will remain a significant one when analyzing
aspects of gulf politics.
While this thesis has focused on the potential of revising rentier state theory
through analysis of socio-historic trajectories of Bahrain and UAE in an attempt to
explain why events of the Arab spring occurred intensely in one place and not the
other, there are of course limitations that can illuminate areas for future research. On
the top of the list would be aspects of foreign intervention or foreign policy towards
other key international players. One example in the case of Bahrain would be Saudi
Arabia’s stretching influence over the island’s history. The British involvement in the
preliminary years of the UAE is also an example. The influence of foreign countries
has to be brought in to explain the socio-historic trajectories of those states and others

193
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in the region. This is the thesis main message: classical rentier state theory is a very
good start but is not, and should not, be the finale in research on Gulf dynamics.
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